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PATENT POOL OUTSIDERS 
Michael Mattioli† 
ABSTRACT 
Individuals who decline to join cooperative groups—outsiders—raise concerns in 
many areas of law and policy. From trade policy to climate agreements to class action 
procedures, the fundamental concern is the same: a single member of the group who drops 
out could weaken the remaining union. This Article analyzes the outsider problem as it 
affects patents.  
The outsider phenomenon has important bearing on patent and antitrust policy. By 
centralizing and simplifying complex patent licensing deals, patent pools conserve 
tremendous transaction costs. This allows for the widespread production and competitive 
sale of many useful technologies, particularly in the consumer electronics industry. Because 
these transaction-cost savings appear to outweigh the most common competition-related 
concerns raised by patent pools, antitrust authorities generally view these private groups 
favorably. 
Others are less sanguine. Most patent pools are incomplete: for the technologies they 
cover, not all relevant patents are included. The reason for this is understandable. Patent 
holders sometimes believe they can negotiate for higher royalties by declining to join an 
existing pool. Antitrust regulators are aware of this behavior but do not worry much about 
it. A growing number of economists and legal scholars believe, however, that this outsider 
behavior may impose higher costs on pool licensees, detracting from the central benefit 
that patent pools offer—transaction cost savings. These commentators urge antitrust 
regulators to regard patent pools with greater caution and skepticism. 
These calls for caution, however, are based mostly on theories about how patent pools 
should work, rather than on empirical studies. Remarkably, little research has been done 
to shed light on the actual impact of patent pool outsiders. Through an original 
ethnographic study, this Article seeks to remedy this gap. A set of the most notable and 
public episodes of outsider behavior were collected from industry press reports, case reports, 
and historical archives. Crucial new information was then gathered through interviews with 
lawyers and executives directly involved with the episodes studied.  
The study reveals a characteristic of patent pools that has gone unappreciated until 
now: they subtly but powerfully influence bargains that take place “poolside”—i.e., deals 
between patent holders and licensees that take place “in the shadow” of the pool. This 
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spillover effect can beneficially limit the power that theorists have assumed outsiders have. 
This is an unappreciated benefit of cooperation. The theorists, as it turns out, have not 
used the wrong approach, but rather, have been missing some important parameters. 
To further aid regulators, this Article builds upon its qualitative findings by 
introducing a new quantitative technique for estimating the cost that a licensee either incurs 
or saves due to an outsider. Applying this technique to original financial and industry data 
gathered from research subjects, this Article shows that, counterintuitively, patent licensees 
are sometimes better off where cooperation among licensors is partial, rather than 
complete. The inflection point lies where the royalty rate hike that a unified pool would 
need to charge to draw in an outsider is equal to the transaction costs that licensees would 
conserve by dealing with a single pool. 
This study’s revelations have provocative implications that reach beyond patent law. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, slightly fragmented property markets may sometimes 
be preferable to “grand coalitions.” There may exist in any given market for complementary 
patent rights (or other complementary property rights), an optimal level of diffusion of 
ownership that resides between total diffusion and total concentration. Some cooperation 
may not only be better than none, but also better than more. 
Drawing upon this study, antitrust regulators who must evaluate patent pools can 
assemble a clearer and more complete understanding of their overall costs and benefits. 
This Article is also helpful beyond patent law. The ethnographic methodology followed 
here reveals dynamics between outsiders and groups that theory alone has not captured. 
Scholars concerned with outsiders in other areas of law and policy can refine and build 
upon theory by applying a similar ethnographic approach. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A sense of unraveling is in the air. Scholars and experts in far-flung 
corners of law and policy are growing concerned that outsiders—individuals 
who decline to join economic, legal, and social collaborations—will upend 
important policy goals. Ask an international trade expert about outsiders, 
and you may learn why Britain’s 2016 decision to withdraw from the 
European Union could undermine and weaken the remaining federation;1 
ask an expert on climate governance, and you may learn that the United 
States’ decisions to abstain from key treaties could cause cooperation among 
other nations to dissolve;2 ask commentators in corporate law, meanwhile, 
and you may hear concerns that a sole creditor can disrupt a cooperative 
plan to divide an insolvent company’s or nation’s debts. 3  In the grand 
cathedral of law, the outsider concern has become a resounding echo: a 
rogue litigant undermines the efficiencies of a class action by objecting to 
settlement terms;4 a solitary property owner causes a nuisance by refusing to 
 
 1. See Guido Calabresi & Eric S. Fish, Federalism and Moral Disagreement, 101 
MINN. L. REV. 1, 17 (2016) (discussing the potential impact of weak versus strong central 
governments on Britain’s decision to leave); Paul Craig, Brexit: A Drama in Six Acts, 41 
EUR. L. REV. 447, 460 (2016) (discussing some issues plaguing the EU resulting in a “social 
legitimacy deficit”); Horst Eidenmüller, Negotiating and Mediating Brexit, 44 PEPP. L. 
REV. 39, 49 (2016) (warning of “detrimental long-term consequences for the Union as a 
whole” were other Member States to follow the pathway that the U.K. has forged).  
 2. See generally Daniel H. Cole, The Problem of Shared Irresponsibility in 
International Climate Law, in DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 290 (André Nollkaemper & Dov Jacobs eds., 2013) (examining 
how outsider nations that refused to join the Kyoto Protocol affected the underlying goals 
of the federation of countries that did join). 
 3. Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232, 238 
(1987) (“Even when a single creditor and the firm overcome these impediments, they 
cannot readily strike their own deal and ignore the other creditors, because value will flow 
from the consenting creditor to the holdout creditors.”); G. Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. 
Klee, Sovereign Piracy, 56 BUS. LAW. 635, 636 (2001) (discussing the “holdout creditor” 
issue in connection with competing interpretations of a discussion of a “pari passu” clause, 
“a standard clause found in almost all sovereign bond indentures”); Lee C. Buchheit & G. 
Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 EMORY L.J. 1317, 1324 (2002) 
(“Holdout creditors could use this threat of liquidation to extract preferential settlements 
at the expense of the debtor and the other creditors.”). 
 4. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal 
Obligations, 91 B.U. L. REV. 87, 100 (2011) (discussing class action outsiders); Brian T. 
Fitzpatrick, The End of Objector Blackmail?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1623, 1624 (2009) 
(explaining that “[t]he holdout problem in class action litigation” stems from an objector 
to a settlement); Georgene Vairo, Is the Class Action Really Dead? Is That Good or Bad 
for Class Members?, 64 EMORY L.J. 477, 519 (2014) (discussing situations in which 
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cooperate with a neighborhood plan;5 a venture capitalist threatens the 
future of a young company by opportunistically pulling out of a cooperative 
round of funding;6 a reluctant juror stands in the way of a just ruling by 
rejecting the conclusions of her fellow jurors.7 It seems that outsiders are 
everywhere, threatening the good that can come from cooperation.8 
Today, one of the most important debates over outsiders concerns 
patents. A growing number of economists and legal scholars believe that 
patent holders who refuse to join patent pools—cooperative licensing 
clearinghouses—will undermine and sometimes entirely undo the benefits 
that pools deliver.9 Such outsider behavior has been on the rise in recent 
years. 10  Commentators who subscribe to this theory urge antitrust 
regulators, who must evaluate patent pools, to regard pools more skeptically 
than they currently do.11 
 
defendants have the right to walk away from a settlement if a threshold percentage of 
plaintiffs do not participate). See, e.g., In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 185 F. Supp. 
2d 519, 521 (D. Md. 2002) (“[Plaintiffs] would have a right to opt out, and, if there were 
a certain number of opt-outs . . . Microsoft would have the right to withdraw from the 
settlement.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in 
Three Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1040–42 (2008) (discussing nuisance 
doctrine with respect to holdouts and outsiders). 
 6. See, e.g., Joseph L. Lemon, Jr., Don’t Let Me Down (Round): Avoiding Illusory 
Terms in Venture Capital Financing in the Post-Internet Bubble Era, 39 TEX. J. BUS. L. 
1 (2003); Usha Rodrigues & Mike Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation: The 
Evolution of SPACS, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849, 856 (2013) (discussing a study of voting 
procedures in the context of special acquisition corporations that “created what turned out 
to be a costly holdout right”). 
 7. See, e.g., Influences on the Jury, 45 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 643, 656 
(2016) (“A judge who concludes that the jury cannot overcome a deadlock may . . . declare 
a mistrial.”). See generally Jeffrey Abramson, Anger at Angry Jurors, 82 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 591 (2007) (describing a holdout juror’s role in hung juries); Shari Seidman Diamond 
et al., Revisiting the Unanimity Requirement: The Behavior of the Non-Unanimous Civil 
Jury, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 201 (2006) (providing empirical data on holdout behavior on 
juries); Alison Markovitz, Jury Secrecy During Deliberations, 110 YALE L.J. 1493 (2001) 
(discussing the relationship between the holdout juror and jury deliberations).  
 8. Richard Epstein noted insightfully that holdouts and externalities can disrupt an 
efficient allocation of resources. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, 
and the Single Owner: One More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553 (1993).  
 9. See infra Section II.B.1.  
 10. Id. (enumerating recent episodes). 
 11. See, e.g., Reiko Aoki & Sadao Nagaoka, Coalition Formation for a Consortium 
Standard through a Standard Body and a Patent Pool: Theory and Evidence from 
MPEG2, DVD, and 3G at 2–3 (Inst. of Innovation Research Hitotsubashi Univ., 
Working Paper No. 05-01, 2005), http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/
15986/1/070iirWP05-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/547A-HXBJ].  
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This “Patent Outsider Theory,” as we might call it, is more provocative 
than it sounds. Patent pools are important to the consumer technology 
industry, and by extension, to the entire U.S. economy.12 That is because 
they address a big problem: transaction costs. Technology standards that 
the developed world relies upon, such as LTE data and MPEG streaming 
video, cannot be commercialized without the permission of many different 
patent holders. 13  Because dozens of patent holders often hold essential 
pieces of the puzzle, the transaction costs of negotiating a deal with each 
individually would be phenomenally high.14 A patent pool addresses this 
problem by granting manufacturers and service providers permission to use 
the necessary patents through a single agreement. Licensees agree, in return, 
to pay standard royalty rates, which the pools divide among the patent 
holders—i.e., their members. By minimizing the number of licensing 
transactions that must take place, patent pools reduce transaction costs that 
would otherwise persist.15 The benefits are far-reaching. Anyone who has 
owned a smartphone, video game console, personal health device, or 
 
 12. See generally Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual 
Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293 (1996) 
[hereinafter Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules]. For a body of work examining 
different aspects of patent pools, see, for example, FLOYD L. VAUGHAN, THE UNITED 
STATES PATENT SYSTEM (1956); Michael Mattioli, Power and Governance in Patent 
Pools, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 421 (2014); Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual 
Property Transactions: The Case of Patent Pools, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 
123, 129–30, 132, 144 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter Merges, The Case 
of Patent Pools]. 
 13. In the consumer electronics industry, many of these technologies are standards, 
such as formats for digital video, wireless data communications, and the like. As of this 
writing (March 2018), one of the largest patent pool administrators in the country is 
MPEG LA, a company that oversees thirteen patent pools for various standards and is 
overseeing the development of a future pool. Many of these pools have formed in just the 
past five to ten years. For more information, see the MPEG LA website. Revolutionizing 
Intellectual Property Rights Management, MPEG LA, www.mpegla.com/main/
Pages/About.aspx [https://perma.cc/LTB8-K2Q9] (last visited Mar. 11, 2018); see also 
Justin R. Orr, Patent Aggregation: Models, Harms, and the Limited Role of Antitrust, 28 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 525, 553 n.159 (2013) (describing the role of patent pools in 
producing MPEG technology). 
 14. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? 
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698–700 (1998); Michael 
Mattioli, Communities of Innovation, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 103, 110–13 (2012) 
(presenting historical and current case studies of this issue); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the 
Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION 
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 124–26 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001). 
 15. See Robert P. Merges & Michael Mattioli, Measuring the Costs and Benefits of 
Patent Pools, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 281, 297, 319 (2017) (providing estimates of the 
transaction costs pools conserve and associated methods of deriving these methods).  
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modern television has benefited directly from the work that patent pools 
do.16 
How could a sole outsider upset this happy state of affairs? Theorists 
imagine the following: if an important patent holder refused to join a patent 
pool and demanded greater royalties than it would otherwise receive as a 
member of that pool—i.e., supracompetitive prices—licensees would have 
to pay higher royalties than they otherwise would.17 Those higher royalties 
would offset at least some of the transaction cost savings the pool provides 
to those licensees.18 This might motivate other companies to pull away from 
the pool. It is easy enough to spin out hypothetical problems that might 
follow: faced with prohibitively high licensing costs, some would-be 
licensees might decide to focus on other (less preferred) products and 
services. With fewer competing manufacturers to purchase goods from, 
consumers could encounter higher prices. Meanwhile, the reduced patent 
licensing activity could weaken the incentive that patents represent, thus 
dampening research investments. It brings to mind the old proverb, “for 
want of a nail, the shoe was lost; for want of a shoe, the horse was lost,” and 
so on, until a battle, a war, and an entire kingdom are lost, “all for want of 
a horseshoe nail.”19 That’s how the theorists see it, at least. 
This Article suggests that the theorists have it wrong. This conclusion 
is drawn from an original set of case studies that reveal new information 
about real-world constraints that limit the power of patent pool outsiders. 
Most significantly, by publicizing their royalty rates, patent pools signal 
information to licensees about the value of patents in the pool, as well as the 
related patents outside of the pool. In addition, the outsider strategy 
presents considerable risks to patent holders. These factors have not been 
identified or reported on in the literature on patent pools. The research 
draws upon news articles, press releases, and court papers that describe 
important outsider episodes. This Article also uniquely provides deeper 
insight through information that was captured in semi-structured 
interviews with lawyers and executives who were directly involved with 
important episodes where patent holders preferred to license patents outside 
of pools. In addition to illustrating the constraints that pool outsiders are 
under, these case studies reveal some unappreciated aspects of patent pools 
 
 16. As explained in Part II, patent pools have facilitated the use of digital video 
standards that the devices listed in this sentence use. These standards include, for instance, 
MPEG-2 video, Bluetooth, and LTE. 
 17. See infra Section II.B.1. 
 18. Id. 
 19. A notable example of this ancient proverb appears in Benjamin Franklin’s 1758 
book, The Way to Wealth. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE WAY TO WEALTH (1758). 
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that may be relevant in other cooperative settings. This evidence does not 
suggest that the theorists have it wrong because they have approached the 
outsider problem incorrectly, but rather, that they have been missing some 
important dynamics.  
This conclusion has important implications for antitrust policy. As 
mentioned earlier, antitrust regulators evaluate patent pools because, for all 
of their benefits, pools can raise competition concerns. The chief concern, 
as explained in greater depth in Part II of this Article, is that a pool may 
suppress competition between two substitutive technologies by placing 
them both within the pool.20 Aware of this risk, antitrust regulators have 
long sought to weigh the benefits and the costs that individual patent pools 
offer.21 In a 2017 article, Robert Merges and I argued that on average, the 
benefits of patent pools appear to far exceed their costs.22 Interestingly, 
antitrust authorities have long assumed that outsiders are not detrimental to 
patent pools.23 In general, the Department of Justice (DOJ) views patent 
pools favorably. In public advisory notices, the DOJ has expressed its view 
that, absent any unrelated concerns, antitrust authorities will view some 
cooperation among patent holders as better than none.24 
To sum up: the concern about outsiders voiced by academic theorists is 
at odds with the long-held (but unsupported) assumptions of antitrust 
regulators. This Article offers the first empirical view of this topic, and it 
suggests that the regulators have it right: outsiders do not appear to 
 
 20. See infra Section II.A. 
 21. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION 
AND COMPETITION (2007), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/
2007/07/11/222655.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6C4-2HTM] [hereinafter DOJ 
GUIDELINES]. 
 22. Merges & Mattioli, supra note 15 (concluding that on average, patent pools do 
far more good than harm). 
 23. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to William F. Dolan & Geoffrey Oliver, Jones Day 7 (Oct. 21, 2008), 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/busreview/238429.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6PWN-EEYP] [hereinafter RFID Business Review Letter] (“Not all owners of potentially 
blocking patents are currently members of the Consortium—and these owners may never 
join it—potentially limiting efficiency gains. Failure to realize all potential efficiencies does 
not mean, however, that the efficiencies created are noncognizable.”). In their 
communications licensees, patent pools have acknowledged the possibility of outsiders as 
well. See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., No. CIV. 02-2060-B(CAB), 2007 
WL 2900484, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2007) (“Moreover, the MPEG LA sublicensee 
agreement explicitly warns that the MPEG LA pool does not necessarily include all the 
patents necessary to practice the technology and that sublicensee signs the agreement aware 
of such risks.”). 
 24. RFID Business Review Letter, supra note 23. 
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significantly reduce the transaction costs that patent pools conserve. This 
information has short-term and long-term value to regulators: in the short-
term, it provides empirical support for a long-held assumption that has 
recently been called into question; in the longer term, it urges against a 
change in how regulators regard patent pool outsiders in the future. Since 
the nineteenth century, regulators’ attitudes toward patent pools have 
vacillated pendulum-like, between periods of distrust and periods of favor.25 
Although regulators are currently friendly toward pools, the pendulum 
seems likely to swing backward in the future. To further aid regulators, this 
Article introduces a new quantitative technique for estimating the real-
world cost that a licensee either incurs or saves due to an outsider. 
This leads to a second surprising discovery. Drawing upon pricing and 
pooling information collected from interview subjects involved in major 
pools, this Article argues that, under some circumstances, slightly 
fragmented property markets are preferable to “grand coalitions”—i.e., a 
pool containing all relevant patent holders. This argument assumes that a 
unified patent pool would need to entice outsiders to join by offering 
royalties either equal to or greater than the royalties outsiders already collect 
independently.26 Because patent pools typically compensate their members 
according to simple royalty-division formulas, this implies that a pool would 
need to deliver proportionally higher royalties to all members. A pool that 
unifies in this way would charge licensees higher royalty rates than the sum 
of the individual rates that licensees must pay to a partially complete pool 
and to an outsider. Stated more simply, complete unification may often be 
undesirable because it entails the cost of luring in outsiders. Outsiders may 
not be powerful, but multiplication is. These results should be helpful in 
advancing the scholarly debate, and more practically, to antitrust policy. 
This Article’s lessons extend beyond patent law. Considering the 
widespread concern over outsiders in so many areas of law and policy, this 
Article shows that an ethnographic approach based upon interviews and 
novel documentary evidence can add critical information that theoretical 
models are missing. The argument is not that an economic analysis of 
outsiders is inappropriate, but rather, that such an analysis can yield more 
accurate and complete results when the dynamics of the situation are well 
 
 25. See Michael Mattioli, Empirical Studies of Patent Pools, in 2 RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Peter S. Menell 
et al. eds., forthcoming 2018). 
 26. Based on the interviews conducted for this Article, the decision to join a patent 
pool is almost entirely an economic one. Although pool membership may theoretically 
carry spillover benefits—i.e., constructive working relationships with other companies, 
signaling to inventors—such benefits do not appear to factor prominently into the decision 
to join a pool. 
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understood. Experts in other domains far removed from patent and antitrust 
law may find the approach taken here helpful. 
The Article unfolds in three parts: Part II explains the relationship 
between patent pools and federal policies that promote competition and 
innovation. Part II builds on and summarizes prior research showing that 
the benefits of patent pools tend to outweigh their costs. The discussion 
then turns to the recent concerns over patent pool outsiders through a 
review of recent economic and legal scholarship. Part III presents a set of 
case studies of outsider behavior in action. These episodes do not support 
the theory that outsiders meaningfully detract from the benefits patent pools 
offer. Importantly, these case studies lay out new findings that help explain 
why, as regulators have long guessed, patent pools can still be very helpful 
even when they do not contain all of the essential patents involved. Part IV 
presents a new method that antitrust regulators can use to assess the impact 
of outsiders on patent pools. Applying real-world data gathered in this 
study, the Article yields broad new insights that are helpful to policymakers. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Patent pools can be helpful or harmful: on one hand, they conserve vast 
transaction costs; on the other hand, they can dampen competition. Most 
scholarship on patent pools has focused on these potential costs and 
benefits. Recently, however, some scholars have voiced a new concern: they 
argue that the primary benefit patent pools offer—transaction cost 
savings—may not be as robust as most experts believe. As a patent pool 
becomes more economically important, the incentive will grow for some 
patent holders to “go it alone.” They predict that this behavior can impose 
high royalty licensing fees on licensees, thus offsetting the transaction costs 
that pools conserve. 
Outsider behavior appears to be on the rise in patent pools. As one 
subject interviewed for the study in Part III of this Article stated, “this is 
happening more and more, as patent pools have higher difficulties attracting 
patent owners.”27 Whether outsiders are truly a problem for pools and for 
licensees remains an open question. If antitrust authorities are convinced 
that outsiders are a concern, however, they may regard patent pools less 
favorably than they presently do. This Part lays the groundwork for the 
empirical study presented in Part III by discussing these concerns in greater 
detail. 
 
 27. Email from Subject #3 to author (July 18, 2017) (on file with author). 
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A. PATENT POOLS, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITION 
John Donne’s oft-quoted line, “no [one] is an island,” aptly captures the 
role patents play in technology markets.28 Many of the products and services 
that fuel the U.S. economy today incorporate thousands of related patented 
inventions. A widely-cited 2012 study estimated that the average 
smartphone, for example, incorporates approximately 250,000 patented 
technologies.29 A lion’s share of the patents that make up these vast mosaics 
are owned by technology companies.30  
In this environment, patent licensing is important and potentially 
problematic. In theory, any patent holder that blocks the use of a patent 
essential to a product or service could impede commercialization of that 
technology. 31  Manufacturers and service providers thus must achieve a 
daunting goal: they must obtain many licenses from many patent holders. 
Even for firms with ample capital and resources, the transaction costs 
required could be steep—so steep, in fact, that the licensing might often not 
take place.32 Scholars in law and economics sometimes call this unhappy 
outcome, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons”—a term Rebecca Eisenberg 
and Michael Heller coined to describe the underuse of patented inventions 
due to high ex ante costs of aggregating rights.33 
Patent pools address this licensing muddle by serving as 
clearinghouses.34 Groups of patent holders typically form pools to grant 
licensees (usually manufacturers) permission to use their sets of related 
patent rights through unified licenses. Today, most patent pools are 
administered by independent companies with specialized legal and business 
expertise. These companies help establish pools and handle the ongoing 
work of furnishing manufacturers and service providers with licenses, 
collecting royalty payments from them, and then dividing those funds 
among patent holders. Two of the most prominent patent pool 
 
 28. JOHN DONNE, DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS (1624). 
 29. See RPX Corp., Securities Registration Statement, Amendment No. 3 (Form S-
1), at 59 (Apr. 18, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1509432/
00011931251110 1007/ds1a.htm [https://perma.cc/8HSA-D2ST]. 
 30. In this Article, the term “technology companies” refers to companies that 
specialize in computer hardware and software, as well as related digital devices and services. 
Readers should note that many patents are owned by universities and nonpracticing entities 
(“NPEs”) as well. 
 31. See infra Section II.B.1 (explaining this in greater detail). 
 32. This is commonly referred to as “The Complements Problem.” See, e.g., Shapiro, 
supra note 14, at 122–24 (explaining the complements problem as it applies to patents). 
 33. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 699–700. 
 34. See Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 12, at 1319 (discussing 
the clearinghouse function of pools).  
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administrators in the United States are MPEG LA, LLC, based in Denver, 
and Via Licensing Corporation, located in San Francisco.35 
Patent pools deliver considerable benefits to their licensees, patent 
holders, and consumers. By offering collections of patents under standard 
licensing terms, they remove the need for manufacturers and service 
providers to negotiate a series of individual licenses. 36  Patent holders, 
meanwhile, can draw a stream of royalties from a potentially large set of 
licensees. Since the 1850s, this elegant cooperative model has enabled the 
growth of entire industries, from sewing machines, to steel, to airplanes and 
cars, to critical drugs and medical procedures, to wireless data, to digital film, 
to television distribution.37 Today, patent pools are particularly important 
in the field of consumer technology standards. Anyone who has ever 
listened to a compact disc, used a smart phone, owned a video game console, 
or watched a DVD has directly benefited from the work of patent pools.38 
Even in the realm of patent licensing, however, there is no such thing 
as a free lunch. Alongside the transaction costs that they conserve, patent 
pools can generate social costs if they are not carefully designed. One such 
cost can result from reduced competition. Suppose a patent pool includes 
two patented technologies that do the same thing but in slightly different 
ways. In antitrust parlance, such technologies are called “substitutes.”39 By 
bundling two substitute technologies in a single license, a patent pool could 
charge consumers more for both patents than the sum of what each patent 
would command in a competitive licensing market. 40  Considering this 
possibility, it is unsurprising that patent pools have long been scrutinized by 
antitrust regulators.41 
 
 35. See Current Programs, MPEG LA, http://www.mpegla.com/ [https://perma.cc/ 
ZN6V-WAC3] (click on “Current Programs”) (last visited Mar. 11, 2018); Licensing 
Programs, VIA LICENSING, http://www.via-corp.com/us/en/licensing.html 
[https://perma.cc/NFZ6-F5P6] (last visited Oct. 31, 2017). 
 36. See Richard J. Gilbert, Ties That Bind: Policies to Promote (Good) Patent 
Pools, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 8 (2010).  
 37. See Mattioli, supra note 12, at 431–39, 444, 449 (discussing and analyzing the 
royalty division rules in historical patent pools relating to these technologies); Vaughan, 
supra note 12, at 39–68 (discussing historical pools covering these technologies). 
 38. As explained in Part III of this Article, these products all rely upon MPEG-2 
video.  
 39. See DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 21, at 74–78.  
 40. See id. at 77 (“[A] pool containing substitutable patents, i.e., patents covering 
technologies that compete with each other and that licensee producers would choose 
between, may have the anticompetitive effect of increasing the total royalty rate to 
licensees.”). 
 41. See Merges & Mattioli, supra note 15, at 328, 335–36 (explaining that such 
scrutiny has lately been ad hoc and qualitative). 
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Some commentators argue that patent pools can also dampen 
innovation. A patent pool that requires its members to offer a royalty-free 
license back to the pool covering any future patents the licensee acquires 
could, in theory, suppress the incentive of exclusivity that patents ordinarily 
represent. Some scholars believe that companies subject to such “grant-
back” clauses may choose to reduce their innovation investments.42 The 
result could be a net drop in innovation, higher prices for consumers, or 
both. Because of these possibilities, antitrust regulators and courts have long 
attempted to determine whether individual pools do more harm than 
good.43 This has generally been an imprecise, highly qualitative exercise. 
In a 2017 article, Robert Merges and I sought to aid regulators in this 
regard by providing the first empirically grounded estimates of the costs and 
benefits of patent pools.44 We first presented original methods of calculating 
the transaction cost savings that pools provide and the potential social costs 
they impose. We then applied those methods to financial data we obtained 
directly from leading patent pool administrators. Ultimately, we concluded 
that the transaction costs that modern patent pools conserve appear to 
greatly exceed the potential social costs they might impose. We estimated 
that a patent pool organized around popular video and audio standards saves 
the consumer electronics industry conservatively between $400 million and 
 
 42. See id. at 59–62 (discussing the potential social welfare costs of grant-backs); U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE 
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 31 (2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/
files/documents/public_statements/1049793/ip_guidelines_2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2ZBC-DGAR] (“Another possible anticompetitive effect of pooling 
arrangements may occur if the arrangement deters or discourages participants from 
engaging in research and development, thus retarding innovation.”). 
 43. See, e.g., DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 21, at 2 (“The Antitrust Division of the 
U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (the ‘Agencies’) 
frequently address complex antitrust questions related to conduct involving the exercise of 
intellectual property rights in enforcement actions, reports, testimony, reviews of proposed 
business conduct, and amicus curiae or ‘friend of the court’ briefs filed in the federal courts 
of appeals and the Supreme Court.”). For a discussion of the DOJ’s view of patent pools, 
see id. at 8–9. 
 44. See generally Merges & Mattioli, supra note 15. Our study was prompted in part 
by recent calls for greater antitrust regulation of pools. See, e.g., Steven C. Carlson, Patent 
Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 383 (1999) (“[T]he DOJ and 
the FTC should not adopt a per se rule of legality for the pooling of blocking patents, and 
that they must carefully stipulate the permissible bounds of those pools deemed 
procompetitive”); Scott Sher, Jonathan Lutinski & Bradley Tennis, The Role of Antitrust 
in Evaluating the Competitive Impact of Patent Pooling Arrangements, 13 SEDONA 
CONF. J. 111, 112 (2012) (“[A]ntitrust enforcement can and should take a more central 
role in the evaluation of the competitive effects of mass marketed patent pools containing 
thousands of separate and likely competing patents”). 
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$600 million dollars.45 On the other side of the equation, potential costs 
associated with lost competition or innovation appear to be far lower.46 
Patent pools might not deliver a “free lunch,” but they look like a remarkably 
good bargain. 
B. THE OUTSIDER QUESTION 
Recent scholarship has shown that most modern patent pools do not 
include all of the patents that relate to the technologies they support.47 Anne 
Layne-Farrar and Josh Lerner estimated in a recent study, for instance, that 
the most “complete” modern pools contain eighty-nine percent of the 
patents that a licensee might need. 48  The least complete pools, they 
estimated, contained as few as ten percent of the necessary patent rights. 
They also estimated that “most pools contain roughly one-third of the 
eligible firms.”49 In 2015, Justus Baron and Tim Pohlmann built upon this 
work by examining even more pools and reported consistent findings.50 
Most patent pools, it would seem, are not grand coalitions.51 
One reason why patent pools are incomplete in this sense is that they 
often form through a gradual process. Groups of technology companies 
usually collaborate to design technology standards.52 This work is often 
mediated by standard-setting organizations (SSOs).53 SSOs often require 
collaborators to promise that they will declare any standard-essential patents 
(SEPs) that they hold and to license any such patents under “fair, reasonable 
and non-discriminatory” (FRAND) terms.54 This standard-setting process 
usually comes before any patent pool forms. Only later, once a draft of the 
 
 45. See Merges & Mattioli, supra note 15, at 319–24. 
 46. Id. at 327–38.  
 47. See Anne Layne-Farrar & Josh Lerner, To Join or Not to Join: Examining Patent 
Pool Participation and Rent Sharing Rules, 29 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 294, 299 (2011). 
 48. See id.  
 49. Id. at 298. 
 50. See Justus Baron & Tim Pohlmann, The Effect of Patent Pools on Patenting and 




 51. See Gilbert, supra note 36, at 17 (“The grand coalition is the set of all the relevant 
players.”). 
 52. See generally Jorge L. Contreras, Patents, Technical Standards and Standards-
Setting Organizations: A Survey of the Empirical, Legal and Economics Literature, in 2 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: 
ANALYTICAL METHODS (Peter S. Menell et al. eds., forthcoming 2018) (providing an 
overview of interoperability standards and standards setting organizations). 
 53. Id. at 3 (working version). 
 54. Id. at 17 (working version).  
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standard has been finalized, might some of the collaborators work toward 
forming a pool.55 Typically, the organizers of such a pool issue a public call 
for patents and hire an independent expert to evaluate whether any declared 
patents are essential to the standard. This two-step process—standard-
setting followed by pool formation—is a hallmark of pools designed around 
modern technology standards.56  
Layne-Farrar and Lerner cleverly estimated the participation rates in 
modern standards-based patent pools by comparing the numbers of patents 
included in those pools with the total numbers of patents declared (by their 
owners) to be essential to those pools.57 They explained that the difference 
between these numbers could be the result of deliberate, calculated outsider 
behavior, or simply by disagreements concerning essentiality: “for those 
firms that do join [pools],” they wrote, “their patents are subject to an 
independent review for essentiality and not all patents declared as essential 
to a standard are actually found to be so.”58 On its own, this evidence does 
not reveal whether the apparent lack of coverage in modern pools is the 
result of strategic outsider behavior or simply disagreements between patent 
holders and evaluators about essentiality. 
But then Layne-Farrar and Lerner investigated patent pool 
participation more deeply. They examined whether patent holders were 
more likely to seek membership in patent pools that stood to compensate 
them relatively well.59 Patent pools compensate their members by divvying-
up royalties paid to the pool by licensees according to simple formulas.60 
Most commonly, these formulas are based upon pro-rata or per-capita 
divisions.61 This “rough and ready” approach to royalty sharing is attractive 
to many patent holders because it makes licensing simple, certain, and 
enables a volume of licensing that would otherwise be difficult and costly.62 
Layne-Farrar and Lerner found that firms that possibly owned essential 
patents were less likely to seek participation in pools with royalty-division 
 
 55. See Jorge L. Contreras, When a Stranger Calls: Standards Outsiders and 
Unencumbered Patents, 12 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 507, 510–12 (2016). 
 56. Since the 1850s, patent pools have formed differently in many industries. Some 
have been collective solutions to litigation among patent holders, while others have been 
in response to pressure exerted by the federal government. See Mattioli, supra note 14, at 
119–47. 
 57. Layne-Farrar & Lerner, supra note 47, at 297–301. 
 58. Id. at 298. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Mattioli, supra note 12, at 439–55, 463 (cataloging royalty division and 
apportionment in historical and present-day pools).  
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 446 (referring to this as a “rough and ready” approach). 
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rules that stood to undercompensate them.63 This finding, they explained, 
is suggestive of a deliberate outsider behavior rather than a disagreement 
over essentiality.64 The authors did not conclude, however, that this kind of 
imperfect cooperation is a practical problem for pools. 
1. The Concerned View of Outsiders 
To understand why outsider behavior concerns some scholars, it is 
helpful to introduce two intertwined concepts: holdouts and the 
complements problem.65 Hold-out situations often arise when a prospective 
property buyer or licensee needs to strike deals with many individual 
property owners. A canonical example is the development of a shopping 
mall that will sit where a set of individually-owned lots exist. 66  Upon 
learning that his or her rights are essential to the developer’s plan, each 
property owner has an incentive to drive a hard bargain.67 Trouble arises, 
however, if the owners of these complementary property rights individually 
demand prices that lead to an unworkable aggregate for the prospective 
buyer.68 If one or more property owners demand royalties that are high 
enough, no deals will be made, rendering all parties worse off.69 This is the 
complements problem. 
In a 1999 article in the journal Science, Michael Heller and Rebecca 
Eisenberg argued that a similar dynamic may play out in patent licensing 
markets—i.e., that a single patent holder aware that it can block access to a 
necessary technology could hold out for high royalties.70 If multiple patent 
 
 63. See Layne-Farrar & Lerner, supra note 47, at 296; see also Peter Bright, New 
Patent Group Threatens to Derail 4K HEVC Video Streaming, ARS TECHNICA (July 23, 
2015, 9:55 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/07/new-patent-group-
threatens-to-derail-4-hevc-video-streaming/ [https://perma.cc/EU4Q-Y76A] (“If those 
companies are unhappy with MPEG LA’s terms, they don’t have to participate. It appears 
so far that at least five companies have decided to do just that: HEVC Advance claims 
General Electric, Technicolor, Dolby, Philips, and Mitsubishi Electric as members.”). 
 64. Id. 
 65. The first discussion of this problem is typically credited to the French 
mathematician AUGUSTIN COURNOT. See AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO 
THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH 103–04 (Nathaniel T. 
Bacon trans., 2d ed. 1971) (1838) (explaining the problem). 
 66. See, e.g., Richard McGregor & Yu Sun, China’s ‘Nail House’ Floors Developers, 
FIN. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2007, at 6 (offering a real-life example of this holdout behavior). 
 67. See Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust 
Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1160 (2009) (discussing the holdout or holdup dilemma); 
Shapiro, supra note 14, at 124–29 (same). 
 68. Shapiro, supra note 14, at 125 
 69. Cf. id. 
 70. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 698. Arti Rai has also written important 
foundational commentary on modern patent pools in the biopharmaceutical industry and 
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holders behave in this way, with no regard for their impact on the overall 
cost for would-be licensees, the technology may become too costly to 
license. They famously termed this outcome “The Tragedy of the 
Anticommons.”71 The authors acknowledged, however, that patent pools 
could overcome this problem.72 Robert Merges later developed this point 
into a landmark publication that offered some optimism: patent pools 
themselves are the evidence, Merges argued, of the power of private actors 
to wisely overcome holdout situations and the related complements 
problem.73 
Outsiders (as the term is used in this Article) are like traditional 
holdouts, but they imply some unique dynamics. Like the holdout, the 
outsider pressures a buyer or licensor for supracompetitive rates. Unlike the 
holdout, however, the outsider can also lean upon a set of insiders—i.e., a 
group of complementary rights holders. The outsider seeks to bargain in the 
shadow of this cooperative group, trading off its efficiencies.74 In doing so, 
the outsider can theoretically not only demand high rates from licensees, 
but also exert pressure on the insiders by demanding a larger share of the 
pie in exchange for its cooperation.75 
 
in the consumer technology industry—including the pools studied in this Article. See Arti 
K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of 
Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 848 (2001) (“To be sure, the 
MPEG-2 and DVD patent pools represent something of a high-water mark of 
procompetitiveness in a patent pool.”). 
 71. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 698. 
 72. See id. at 701. 
 73. See Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 12, at 1319. 
 74. François Lévêque & Yann Ménière, Technology Standards, Patents and 
Antitrust, 9 COMPETITION & REG. NETWORK INDUSTRIES 29, 34 (2008) (“Still, some 
patent owners may prefer not to participate in the patent pool so as to take advantage of 
the collective self-discipline accepted by those who did join the pool. This hold out problem 
arises basically because an essential patent owner can always charge a higher price if it 
manages to set its price after the others.”). For the foundational discussion of the 
“bargaining of the shadow” concept, see generally, Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the 
Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 
(1982).  
 75. In other words, this expanding body of scholarship suggests that cooperative 
failures not only lead to suboptimal licensing, but also that at least some patent holders 
waste capital in ill-fated efforts to prevent that very result. See also Steffen Brenner, 
Optimal Formation Rules for Patent Pools, 40 ECON. THEORY 373, 374 (2009) 
(discussing the outsider problem as it affects the welfare-enhancing aspects of patent 
pools); Gilbert, supra note 36, at 17–18 (discussing the factors that might make joining a 
pool more or less compelling to an individual patentee); Daniel Quint, Pooling with 
Essential and Nonessential Patents, 6 AM. ECON. J. MICROECONOMICS 23, 34 (2013) 
(noting that the outsider problem “creates a free rider problem which may prevent pools 
from reaching their optimal size”); Gastón Llanes & Joaquín Poblete, Ex Ante Agreements 
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Scholarly concerns about patent pool outsiders first surfaced in a paper 
written by Reiko Aoki and Sadao Nagaoka, published in 2005. The paper 
examined the factors that might lead patent holders in different industries 
to become pool outsiders.76 The authors presented an economic model that 
explained how outsiders who negotiate in the shadow of established patent 
pools could, under some circumstances, demand higher royalties than the 
pool would deliver. The outsider can free-ride, they posited, off the 
efficiencies and certainty of licensing enabled by the pool.77 Their model 
suggested, however, that this will usually tend to happen when the number 
of essential patent holders is large.78 In settings where few patent holders 
operate, they predicted that a “grand coalition” is possible.79 Considering 
the large numbers of essential patents in modern standards pools, the 
authors concluded, “there is indeed a risk of the tragedy of anti-commons.”80 
In a 2003 California Law Review article, Michael R. Franzinger 
expressed similar concerns relating to a patent pool designed to cover 3G 
wireless technologies. 81  The wireless giant, Qualcomm, Franzinger 
explained, was vocal in its reluctance to join the pool. Franzinger posited 
that this may have been because Qualcomm drew its revenues primarily 
from licensing rather than manufacturing. 82  “Especially for a 
nonmanufacturing patent holder who only wishes to license out its 
technology and not to obtain reciprocal licenses from others,” he wrote, 
“there would seem to be no good reason to join the Platform.”83 Franzinger 
added, “[t]he lack of full industry-wide participation may dilute the 
 
in Standard Setting and Patent Pool Formation, 23 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 50, 
50 (2014) (studying the effects of “pool-formation rules on technology choice, prices, and 
welfare”).  
 76. See Aoki & Nagaoka, supra note 11, at 3. The authors explained that “[t]he 
breakdown of an integrated patent pool,” caused either by an outsider, or by the splintering 
of the pool into multiple licensing groups, “not only raises the total price to be paid by the 
licensees but also reduces the joint profit of the patentees.” Id. 
 77. See id. at 8; see also Mattioli, supra note 12, at 439–51 (indicating that patent 
pools allocate royalties to their members through formulas agreed upon when the pool is 
created).  
 78. See Aoki & Nagaoka, supra note 11, at 21 (“[T]he emergence of an outsider is 
inevitable [because] . . . a firm can gain by becoming an outsider and [this] gain increases 
as the coalition of the other firms expands.”). 
 79. Id. at 21 (“[A] grand coalition can be implemented only if the number of essential 
patent holders (n) is small.”). 
 80. Id. at 22. 
 81. Michael R. Franzinger, Latent Dangers in a Patent Pool: The European 
Commission’s Approval of the 3G Wireless Technology Licensing Agreements, 91 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1693, 1706 (2003). 
 82. See id.  
 83. Id. 
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competitive benefits of [a patent pool] more than it dilutes its dangers,” and 
concluded that the risk of “capture” presented by patent pool outsiders is 
significant and deserving of policy intervention.84 
In a 2010 article, the esteemed economist Richard Gilbert observed that 
“patentees are not compelled to negotiate with other patentees” to address 
a collective negative externality.85 Gilbert explained that the more a pool 
thrives, the greater is there a rational impulse for members to defect.86 In 
the context of patent pools, Gilbert wrote: 
The more the pool succeeds in lowering royalties and avoiding 
transaction costs, the greater is the benefit from independent 
licensing of an essential patent. The incentive to leave the pool (or 
not join in the first place) is analogous to the incentive to defect 
from a cartel. By restricting output and raising prices, harmful 
cartels make it profitable for a firm to act as an independent 
competitor.87 
Gilbert analyzed the outsider problem through the economic theory of 
the core—a framework that examines the ability of players in a given 
economic setting to form beneficial coalitions.88 “In the patent example,” he 
explained, “the core exists if every patentee prefers its payoff when part of a 
pool that consists of all patentees to the payoff it could get in any different 
coalition of patentees.”89 Gilbert further added that “[p]atent owners that 
choose to remain outside a pool can unravel the benefits from pooling by 
interfering with one-stop shopping and by demanding high royalties.”90 
It is helpful to synthesize these concerns into a coherent picture. One 
concern appears to be that licensees will pay more in settings where a sole 
licensor operates outside of a pool than they would pay if the same patent 
holder had joined the pool.91 If this cost difference is great, it might shut 
 
 84. Id.; see id. at 1727. 
 85. Gilbert, supra note 36, at 17 (“The grand coalition is the set of all the relevant 
players.”). 
 86. Id. at 16–8. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 18. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 28. 
 91. It is helpful to distinguish this concern from the concern that royalty-free cross-
licenses between pool members can give them an unfair advantage over licensees. Kenneth 
Flamm argued that this advantage became unfair in the DVD landscape as the price of 
manufacturing the technology dropped: “Within a few short years, however, the royalties 
charged by the DVD patent pools evolved into truly significant sums relative to the total 
cost of manufacturing optical disk drives (ODDs)—indeed they now account for the 
majority of manufacturing cost for a potential entrant.” Kenneth Flamm, A Tale of Two 
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some would-be licensees out of the market. A related concern has to do with 
the effect that outsiders have on the overall cohesion of the pool. If every 
member of a pool acts on a rational impulse to “go it alone,” the group will 
splinter apart, setting the stage for an anticommons. 
Although there have been no empirical studies of the impact of patent 
pool outsiders, Jorge Contreras’ recent study of patent infringement lawsuits 
brought by “standards outsiders” helps illuminate this discussion. 92 
Contreras was interested in patent holders unencumbered by FRAND 
obligations. He identified lawsuits where such “standards outsiders” 
brought suits against technology producers.93 Contreras’ research goal was 
to see whether “[the standards outsiders] could potentially seek rents in 
excess of the rates received by [insiders].” 94  Contreras found that suits 
brought by outsiders make up an appreciable proportion of all assertions of 
standard-essential patents.95 He also found that the companies that bring 
these suits most often are so-called nonpracticing entities. 96  These 
conclusions are concerning, but they leave open the question of what 
impact, if any, patent pool outsiders have on the efficiencies pools offer. 
Industry stakeholders and market analysts are often concerned by 
outsiders as well. In 2015, for instance, industry commentators warned that 
the existence of two 4K video patent pools “threatened to derail” the future 
of streaming videos by increasing the cost of licensing of the underlying 
technology.97 In 2012, when Nokia, Apple, and Google withdrew from 
patent pooling efforts related to the LTE wireless data standard used by 
smartphones, similar predictions were reported in the Wall Street Journal.98 
 
Standards: Patent Pools and Innovation in the Optical Disk Drive Industry 20 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18931, 2013), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18931.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z42Q-2RX3]. This 
criticism is not really about the outsider problem, however. 
 92. See Contreras, supra note 55.  
 93. Id. at 507. 
 94. Id. at 520. 
 95. Id. at 535.  
 96. Id. at 518–19.  
 97. Stephen Shankland, Next-gen High-res Video Faces New Fees and Uncertainty, 
CNET (Mar. 26, 2015, 6:40 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/patent-group-raises-
new-fees-uncertainty-for-4k-video/ [https://perma.cc/T3RK-ZZ7N]. (“‘[The 
introduction of HEVC Advance] creates confusion in the market,’ especially given MPEG 
LA’s pool of patents from 27 different patent holders, said Frost & Sullivan analyst Dan 
Rayburn. ‘They put out a press release that scares a lot of content owners, and then won’t 
give any details . . . I’ve got content owners saying this is bad for my business.’”). 
 98. See Don Clark, Plan to Pool LTE Patents Takes Shape, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 3, 
2012, 8:01 AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2012/10/03/plan-to-pool-lte-patents-
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A few years earlier, industry analysts made similar comments about the 3G 
wireless data and MPEG-2 video patent pools, each of which did not 
include important patent holders.99 
2. The Sanguine View of Outsiders 
Antitrust authorities have assumed that patent pool outsiders are not a 
problem. Their assumption is simply that some pooling is more helpful than 
none at all. 100  This optimistic view is supported by ample anecdotal 
evidence: as mentioned earlier, many important industries appear to have 
flourished due to patent pools. If outsider behavior was truly a problem, one 
would expect to see far fewer successful pools, as well as lower 
commercialization and higher prices of the technologies around which they 
are organized. 
In a 2006 paper, Douglas Lichtman suggested why this might be. He 
made the important point that outsiders could be companies that are known 
 
takes-shape/ (acknowledging that some companies tend to act independently when it 
comes to patent matters). 
 99. See Franzinger, supra note 81, at 1706. (“The lack of full industry-wide 
participation may dilute the competitive benefits of the Platform more than it dilutes its 
dangers.”); Vikrant Narayan Vasudeva, Patent Valuation and License Fee Determination 
in Context of Patent Pools, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (July 9, 2014), https://cis-
india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-valuation-and -license-fee-determination-in-context-of-
patent-pools [https://perma.cc/4895-W3U6] (“Correspondingly, if the patent pool does 
not contain all the patents it cannot curtail royalty stacking issues for the users. For 
example, Alcatel-Lucent pursued infringement claims for patents that it alleged covered 
the MPEG-2 standard and were not in the pool.”).  
 100. See, e.g., Letter from Joel Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Garrard R. Beeney, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell 13 n.58 (Dec. 16, 1998), 
https://www.justice.gov/ sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/04/27/2121.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EJ3W-5JH7] [hereinafter DVD Business Review Letter] 
(“Transaction costs to licensees would almost certainly be somewhat lower if these later 
patents were included in the pool, instead of being subject to separate negotiations. 
However, the fact that this pool might not enable the realization of all potential efficiencies 
of pooling patents in this area does not mean that the efficiencies that it does create are 
insubstantial or that the arrangement is anticompetitive or unlawful.”); RFID Business 
Review Letter, supra note 23, at 8 (proposing that a pool will yield cognizable efficiencies, 
although those efficiencies may not be as great as they would be if the pool contained all 
essential patents); Gilbert, supra note 36, at 26 (“Nonetheless, even partial pools that do 
not include all patents that are necessary to make or use a product offer considerable savings 
in transaction costs and can mitigate royalty stacking compared to separate licensing with 
independent patentees.”); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty 
Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2014–15 (2007) (“Such a patent holder might well 
maximize its revenues by staying out of a proposed patent pool and asserting its patent 
rights independently, unless it believes that its failure to join the pool will undermine the 
formation of the pool and thus seriously hinder sales of the product in question.”). 
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before a technology is in widespread use or after the fact.101 In the former 
case, an outsider theoretically would possess only the power to demand 
royalties that reflect the marginal value of its patents. This would be 
because, if an outsider’s demands are viewed as excessive by prospective 
licensees (which may include pool members), given enough time, the 
industry can simply adopt a different technology in place of the one hold-
out. Lichtman theorized that patent holders that assert themselves after a 
technology is in widespread use, meanwhile, may ironically be in a poor 
position if there are very many of them. Just as a creditor can only receive a 
smaller share of the pie if it is one of many, Lichtman posited, in a market 
that can only pay a limited maximum rate, each of many outside licensors 
can only have a weak leverage.102 Lichtman believed that licensees have 
more power and that patent holders are more farsighted than the pessimists 
have guessed. These predictions cast doubt on the outsider concern. As 
Lichtman explained, the risk of being one of many holdouts fosters “less of 
an incentive for a firm to strategically delay in the hopes of being a patent 
holdout, and less of an incentive for an accidental patent holdout to actually 
bring suit.”103 
Another possibility is that pools set a practical baseline for independent 
licensors. A recent dispute between Microsoft and Motorola suggests this 
is so. In Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., the Ninth Circuit instructed 
that a patent pool may serve as a useful data point in determining a 
“reasonable” rate under a FRAND obligation.104 Jonathan Barnett posited 
that multiple complementary patent licensors may “signal” royalty rates to 
one another, leading to an aggregate cost that is workable.105 As the study 
presented in Part III of this Article shows, Barnett is correct. 
In addition, patent owners do not always sue unlicensed users. Herbert 
Hovenkamp and Eric Hovenkamp suggest that a licensee will not be 
“meaningfully blocked as a matter of fact” if, “for example, . . . there is a 
widespread belief that a blocking patent is invalid, such that competitors are 
willing to practice the blocked technology without a license 
 
 101. See Douglas G. Lichtman, Patent Holdouts and the Standard Setting Process 1–
3 (Univ. of Chi. John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper, Paper No. 292, 2006). 
 102. See id. at 6–7. 
 103. Id. at 6. 
 104. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1043 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(“Motorola provided no evidence that its patents were more valuable than the other 
patents in the pool.”). 
 105. See Jonathan Barnett, From Patent Thickets to Patent Networks: The Legal 
Infrastructure of the Digital Economy, 55 JURIMETRICS 1, 41–42 (2014). 
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notwithstanding the risk of an infringement suit.” 106  This accords with 
Rebecca Eisenberg’s observation—which has been echoed by other 
scholars—that many patented technologies are used without permission 
with no legal consequences for the infringer.107 Because of this, Eisenberg 
notes, the effective reach of a patent may fall short of its nominal reach.108 
This reasoning suggests that the same may be true for patent pools: a pool 
that does not contain all patents that relate to a technology may nonetheless 
be effectively complete if the outsiders permit the unlicensed use of their 
patents. 
On one side of this debate, economic theory urges greater concern over 
patent pool outsiders; on the other side, the long-held intuition of regulators 
is that these independent patent holders do not meaningfully detract from 
the transaction costs that pools mitigate. If the theorists have it right, then 
regulators may wish to rethink their long-held assumptions; if, on the other 
hand, regulators are correct that outsiders dampen the benefits of patent 
pools, then academic debate on this subject could be meaningfully 
advanced. The next Part presents the results of an original study that adds 
new empirical insights to this debate. 
III. AN ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDY OF PATENT POOL 
OUTSIDERS 
This Part presents a study of patent pool outsiders—i.e., episodes where 
essential patent holders have declined to join pools and instead licensed 
independently. 
A. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology followed here was deeply influenced by the work of 
Nobelist Elinor Ostrom, who famously developed the Institutional Analysis 
 
 106. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK JANIS, MARK LEMLEY & CHRISTOPHER R. 
LESLIE, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 34.04[C] at 34-8 (3d ed. 2016). 
 107. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Has the Academy Led Patent Law Astray?, 32 
BERKELEY TECH L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (arguing that unlicensed infringing uses are 
extremely common); David J. Teece, The “Tragedy of the Anticommons” Fallacy: A Law 
and Economics Analysis of Patent Thickets and FRAND Licensing, 32 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (arguing that uncompensated, infringing uses are net more 
harmful to innovation than patent thickets); Rebecca Eisenberg, Patent Costs and 
Unlicensed Use of Patented Inventions, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 53, 53–54 (2011) (“Empirical 
work suggests that unlicensed use of patented inventions is common in research . . . 
Unlicensed use is likely pervasive in other settings as well, including commercial 
production.”). 
 108. See Eisenberg, supra note 107, at 55–56. 
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and Design (IAD) framework. Using this approach, which entails defining 
broad categories of inquiry, Ostrom and the many scholars she inspired have 
shed light on how groups manage shared resources (including property 
rights) in a variety of settings.109 Katherine Strandburg, Brett Frischmann, 
and Michael Madison have recently adapted the IAD framework to the 
study of “knowledge commons,” such as patent pools. 110  Inspired and 
informed by this body of work, this Article adopts a similar ethnographic 
approach.111 
This study analyzes the following research question: “Do outsiders 
(independent licensors) impose significant costs on licensees or otherwise 
undermine the transaction costs conserved by patent pools?” I focused my 
research on the following research topics112: (1) the technological, industrial, 
and social contexts in which outsider episodes occurred; (2) the patents 
involved, including their numbers and their relationships to the patents in 
pools; (3) the firms and institutions involved; (4) the motivations and goals 
of the licensors and pool administrators involved; (5) the internal 
governance rules of the pools and outside licensors involved; (6) outcomes, 
with a focus on costs and benefits.  
This work began with a broad literature review. To learn about the topic 
and to identify potential case studies and research study subjects, I searched 
through newspaper and industry press archives for well-documented 
episodes of patent pool outsiders. Because this work revealed several 
episodes that involved litigation, I carefully studied lawsuits by reviewing 
court decisions, docket filings, and corporate press releases, such as 
 
 109. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE 
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 182–85 (1990). For an 
example of an ethnographic approach applied to study outsiders outside of patent settings, 
see generally Cole, supra note 2 (examining how outsider nations that refused to join the 
Kyoto Protocol affected the underlying goals of the federation of countries that did join). 
Surprisingly, outsiders in that setting not only failed to weaken, but in fact strengthened, 
coalitions of rights-holders. 
 110. See generally Peter B. Meyer, An Inventive Commons: Shared Sources of the 
Airplane and Its Industry, in GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 341 (Brett M. 
Frischmann, Michael J. Madison & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2014).  
 111. The methodology carried out borrowed heavily from the IAD framework but did 
not formally adhere to that framework in every respect. See Michael Mattioli, The Data-
Pooling Problem, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 179, 224 (2017) (describing an analogous 
targeted application of the IAD framework). More specifically, aspects of the IAD 
framework that were not relevant to the central question under examination were not 
employed. 
 112. Brett M. Frischmann et al., Governing Knowledge Commons, in GOVERNING 
KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 1, 20 (Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison & Katherine 
J. Strandburg eds., 2014).  
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announcements of settlements. Because the DOJ reviewed the pools 
examined, this study gathered helpful details from publicly available letters 
exchanged between pool organizers and the Antitrust Division of the 
DOJ. 113  I also gathered critical information about pool composition 
(patents, membership, and licensees) from the websites of patent pool 
administrators. Archived copies of these same webpages revealed pool 
membership data from earlier points in time.114 In some cases, publicly 
available annual reports to shareholders were reviewed as well. 
With a preliminary record assembled, I sought to construct a deeper and 
richer understanding by interviewing individuals directly involved with 
selected outsider episodes. I contacted and interviewed executives and 
lawyers who work for the largest patent pool administrators in the United 
States. I then interviewed executives and counsel at large technology 
companies, some of which were members of pools, and some of which were 
outsiders of prominent pools. 
All interviews were conducted by telephone and email in a semi-
structured fashion and focused on a set of interview questions that I shared 
with the individuals beforehand. The questions were divided into two lines 
of inquiry: the impact of outsider behavior on patent pools generally, and 
questions pertaining to specific case studies. Most conversations led to 
follow-up emails and phone conversations. In the interest of clarity, the 
findings are reported here in three sub-parts: a set of general observations 
followed by two deep case studies. 
A note on the selection of case studies: there are many episodes of 
outsider behavior that can be analyzed. This study proceeded on the premise 
that depth would be more helpful than breadth. Rather than cataloging as 
many outsider episodes as possible, the goal was instead to provide deep and 
nuanced portraits of this behavior. The first two modern-day patent pools, 
covering MPEG-2 video and DVD, were selected because they revealed a 
rich variety of dynamics and because they are related to one another, as 
explained in the discussion that follows. Research subjects opined that these 
two episodes offer lessons that are broadly applicable. Research subjects also 
offered high-level insights on outsider behavior, generally. This information 
is presented first. 
 
 113. See Business Review Letters and Request Letters, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/business-review-letters-and-request-letters [https://perma.cc/ 
RL84-WSWG] (last updated Dec. 27, 2017). 
 114. Historical copies of these pages were gathered from the Internet Archive. See 
About the Internet Archive, INTERNET ARCHIVE, https://archive.org/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/ TU5V-7PEB] (last visited Mar. 11, 2018). 
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Relatedly, although great efforts were made to avoid bias, it is possible 
that selection bias is present. Selection bias is a fundamental challenge in 
nearly all ethnographic work, and the challenge is heightened where the 
sample size—i.e., the number of cases observed—is small, as it is here.115 
To minimize this risk, I analyzed as many relevant episodes as I could find 
and based my “general” category of questions on what those episodes 
appeared to reveal. Research subjects explained that the two selected case 
studies illustrate important dynamics between outsiders and patent pools. It 
is possible that the individuals who agreed to be interviewed for this study 
may, by coincidence, happen to share similar subjective opinions. To 
minimize the odds of this, the interviews include a range of experts on 
different sides of the outsider issue—i.e., outsiders, insiders, and pool 
administrators—however.  
An additional challenge is the fact that the only episodes that could be 
explored deeply were those in which patent pools had successfully taken 
form. At least one licensor speculated that a “critical mass” of licensors must 
agree to join a patent pool for any cooperation to take place at all. Because 
there is little to no available information on point, it is very difficult to 
examine pools that might have formed but did not. Fortunately, however, 
this study can comfortably leave such episodes out of the analysis: the 
purpose of this Article is to offer insights to antitrust regulators who are 
tasked with examining patent pools that have necessarily gathered sufficient 
critical mass. 
B. THE UNAPPRECIATED INFLUENCE OF POOLS 
This section describes general observations that interview subjects 
shared about patent pools and outsiders who decide, for various reasons, not 
to join a pool. The two case studies that follow this discussion illustrate the 
insights summarized here. 
As a threshold matter, interview subjects explained that it is difficult to 
say with certainty if any patent pool contains “all” of the necessary patents 
involved. “There’s no way to know whether you have all of the patents in a 
pool,” one subject commented.116 He added, “there might be unknown 
 
 115. See AMY R. POTEETE, MARCO A. JANSSEN & ELINOR OSTROM, WORKING 
TOGETHER 36 (2010) (“Small samples present two serious limitations: selection bias and 
indeterminacy. A sample is biased if the cases observed do not represent variation on the 
dependent or independent variable accurately.”). 
 116. Telephone Interview with Larry Horn, President & CEO, and Bill Geary, Vice 
President of Bus. Dev., MPEG LA, LLC (Feb. 23, 2017) [hereinafter Telephone 
Interview with Horn & Geary] (on file with author). 
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patent holders at the time of a pool’s formation.”117 Another subject stated 
that it is almost “inevitable” that there are one or more independent or 
outside patent holders.118 Some are, this subject explained, nonpracticing 
entities that own patents that “just happen, by coincidence, to read on the 
standard to which the pool relates.”119 
These observations capture a fundamental insight: patent pooling is not 
neatly analogous to real property assembly, such as the canonical land 
development example discussed in Part I. Unlike the land developer who 
can know with certainty the underlying property rights that she must gather 
before breaking ground, a technology manufacturer can never be entirely 
sure of every possible patent that might read on its product. This is because 
the boundaries of patent rights are inherently less certain than those of real 
property.120 Relatedly, the validity (and hence, the enforceability) of the 
patents identified is generally less certain than the rights of a property 
owner.121 The operative question for manufacturers, then, might not be 
whether a pool contains “all” of the relevant patents in existence, but rather, 
whether the pool helps licensees obtain permission from the companies 
most likely to sue them for infringement. Stated differently, the technical 
or nominal coverage of a pool may be less important than its effective 
coverage. 
Moving beyond this threshold observation, the most important insight 
shared by research subjects is that patent pools significantly influence the 
royalty rates that outsiders can ask for and receive. By publishing their rates, 
patent pools signal the value of the portfolios of patents they offer. This 
gives licensees a basis to negotiate rates for other essential patents outside 
of the pool. As one subject stated, “there is no doubt that the royalties asked 
by a major pool influence the royalties asked by other patent holders.”122 
Another explained that the royalty rate offered by the pool not only limits 
the power of the outsider, but also “lowers negotiation costs by orders of 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Telephone Interview with Ruud Peters, Exec. Vice President & Advisor, 
Koninklijke Philips N.V. (July 15, 2017) (on file with author). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Real property is defined by geographic coordinates. By contrast, the metes and 
bounds of patents are defined by claim language, which is inherently more subject to 
interpretation and validity challenges. See Clark D. Asay, The Informational Value of 
Patents, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 259, 270 (2016) (discussing this common analogy). 
 121. David J. Teece, The “Tragedy of the Anticommons” Fallacy: A Law and 
Economics Analysis of Patent Thickets and FRAND Licensing, 32 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1489, 1504 (2016) (discussing the impact of uncertainty with respect to validity on 
damages calculations). 
 122. Email from Subject #5 to author (July 11, 2017) (on file with author). 
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magnitude for all licensing done in the shadow of the pool.”123 Yet another 
subject added, “the patent pool sets a de facto market reference.”124 
A pool’s rate signals a ballpark sense of value. It would be a mistake to 
assume that a patent pool’s influence can be boiled down to a simple “per-
patent” measure of value. One reason for this is that the composition of 
patent pools is dynamic. Old patents expire, new patents join, and all the 
while, the royalty rate charged by the pool does not rise or fall in response.125 
As a result, a simple per-patent calculation would problematically yield a 
frequently shifting baseline for outside negotiations. Alongside this problem 
is the fact that a single invention can spawn many patents. This is because 
inventions are often patented in different countries, and claims are 
sometimes split into divisionals.126 Complicating licensing matters further, 
the same invention may not always be represented by the same number of 
patents in different countries. (A product that requires ten U.S. patent 
licenses to manufacture might require only seven German patent licenses, 
for instance.) This explains why the influence of patent pools on outside 
negotiations is not so simple as a per-patent pool rate.127 Although some 
research subjects referred to the “per-patent” value of pools, further 
discussions clarified that this term was used imprecisely. A more helpful 
(but still imperfect) way to gauge a pool’s influence on outside 
negotiations at any point in time might be “per-invention” or “per-patent-
 
 123. Email from Subject #4 to author (July 15, 2015) (on file with author). 
 124. Telephone Interview with Subject #3 (July 19, 2017) (on file with author). 
 125. Many pools, such as those administered by MPEG LA, drop their royalty rates 
over time, but this is not caused by the removal of patents. These decisions are made at the 
time of pool formation and discussions surrounding these decisions are typically 
confidential. 
 126. John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 1064 (2003) (describing “divisional” patent applications).  
 127. As one subject explained, “[p]atent pools are for the convenience of licensees in 
acquiring patent rights from multiple patent holders at a single rate in a single transaction 
as an alternative to negotiating separate license agreements, and the royalties [in our pools] 
are the same whether one or more patents is infringed/used . . . Similarly, neither do 
royalties increase or decrease based on the number of patents as licensors and patents are 
added to the pool or patent expire, and licensors would be unlikely to volunteer their 
patents for the benefit of licensees if they did. Instead, there is a royalty rate for a pool 
license based on striking a balance between what it takes to retain licensors and offer 
reasonable terms to licensees over the course of a license, and this concept is important for 
understanding a pool’s operation and success.” Email from Larry Horn, President & CEO, 
and Bill Geary, Vice President of Bus. Dev., MPEG LA, LLC to author (July 21, 2017) 
[hereinafter Email from Horn & Geary] (on file with author).  
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family” royalties—a higher number than a “per-patent” calculation would 
produce.128 
There are several reasons why patent pools can exert such an influence 
on negotiations. One explanation appears to be a widespread understanding 
that, if an outsider sued a pool licensee for patent infringement and won, 
under several common scenarios, a court would likely look to the patent 
pool as a reflection of the value of the outsider’s patent. The court would 
assume that, had the outsider been a participant in the standard-setting 
process, it would have likely made a FRAND commitment. Microsoft v. 
Motorola, discussed earlier, indicates that a court may look to a pool’s rates 
for an indication of whether an outsider’s demands are “reasonable,” such 
that they satisfy a FRAND obligation.129 (Recall this decision also instructs 
that a FRAND commitment is a contract, removing the patent holder’s 
power to demand an injunction.)130  
A patent pool’s royalty rate could similarly affect an independent patent 
holder who is not subject to a FRAND commitment, however. As one 
subject explained: 
The pool rate defines a ballpark figure for the per-patent royalty 
that you can ask. If you come in as an independent licensor and 
you demand a multiple of the per-patent royalty the pool is asking 
for [relative to the technology being licensed], then you will meet 
incredible resistance in the negotiations with the potential 
licensees. They will simply refuse to take a license. Then the 
licensor could only get companies licensed if it is prepared to sue. 
In that case, it needs to defend its case before court and it will need 
to show that its royalty is reasonable compared to what the pool is 
asking. That is costly, and takes a long time with an uncertain 
outcome. Most licensors don’t want to litigate each and every 
company and wait for years and years to get their money. So, they 
 
 128. A subject interviewed explained that such negotiations should “begin with the 
recognition that patent pools are for the convenience of licensees in acquiring patent rights 
from multiple patent holders at a single rate in a single transaction as an alternative to 
negotiating separate license agreements and the royalties are the same whether one or more 
patents is infringed/used.” Email from Horn & Geary, supra note 127. 
 129. See Susan Decker, Ericsson Tries to Avoid Patent War by Publishing Rates for 
5G, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 17, 2017, 11:00 AM), www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-
03-17/ericsson-tries-to-avoid-patent-war-by-publishing-rates-for-5g 
[https://perma.cc/TR8W-7JC8]. 
 130. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[B]ecause 
of the RAND licensing commitment, injunctive relief is an inappropriate remedy for 
infringement of standard-essential patents.”).  
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are forced to lower their royalties to a level that the market finds 
acceptable.131 
Another subject made consistent comments, stating that, faced with a high 
royalty demand from an outsider, pool licensees may sometimes decide to 
“efficiently infringe” the patent, even if it is essential to a standard.132 The 
outsider can sue for infringement, that subject explained, but injunctions are 
difficult to obtain in these settings, and monetary awards are more 
common.133 At this stage, explained the subject, it will be up to a court to 
determine the value of the infringed patents. Where might the court look? 
Common wisdom is that the pool is a likely source.134  
The situation is even more constrained for an outside patent holder that 
is also a technology manufacturer, a common situation. To operate, these 
patent holders should obtain licenses to the necessary patents. They may do 
so through the pool or by contacting the individual patent holders. As 
discussed earlier in this Article, some pools have historically required grant-
back promises from licensees, obligating them to license any essential patent 
rights back to the pool. As one subject explained, “a patent holder who also 
manufactures products using the pool technology may be constrained by a 
grant-back provision if he must sign a license with the pool and will 
necessarily grant licenses based on the pool royalty level.”135 Another subject 
commented, “an outsider could ask for very high royalties only if it does not 
have business exposure and so doesn’t need to become a licensee.”136 
Subjects explained that, even in pools without grant-back provisions, 
outside licensors who are also manufacturers may experience similar 
pressures. The reason lies in the simple fact that the independent must come 
to an agreement with the patent holders in the pool. “They will still need 
licenses from the pool licensors,” explained one subject:  
These pool licensors will say to the independent, “I am a member 
of the pool. You are asking on a per-patent basis a multiple of 
what we are asking for our patents. So, either we go with my per-
 
 131. Telephone Interview with Ruud Peters, supra note 118. 
 132. Telephone Interview with Subject #7 (Feb. 23, 2017) (on file with author). 
 133. Id.; see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392–93 (2006) 
(instructing that, contrary to prior judicial practice, judges should not automatically issue 
injunctions upon finding patent infringement).  
 134. Id. 
 135. Email from Subject #5 to author, supra note 122. 
 136. Telephone Interview with Subject #3, supra note 124. 
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patent royalty or we take yours. If we go with yours, then you need 
to pay me your per-patent royalty for the use of my patents.”137  
An outside licensor in this position who asks for an unreasonably high rate, 
the subject explained, “is shooting itself in the foot.”138 
Remarkably, even outsiders who somehow succeed in getting licensees 
to agree to very high royalties do not always benefit in the end. The reason, 
according to some subjects, is the underreporting of sales. One research 
subject explained this through a hypothetical:  
Let’s say you have an independent that is commercially not active 
and assume that it asks for a relatively high royalty rate and that 
licensees agree in the end—because they want to avoid the cost of 
litigation—to take licenses. Normally, these licensees will be 
required to submit quarterly reports with the number of products 
they have sold in that quarter and thus the total royalty amount 
they have to pay. If licensees feel that the royalties they have to 
pay are too high, they may adjust their reported quantities, so that 
effectively their royalty rate comes within the range that they 
believe is more fair and reasonable.139 
Research subjects explained such underreporting “happens on a large 
scale,” even though it violates the contractual obligations of licensees under 
their license agreements.140 In part, this is because underreporting is difficult 
and costly to detect. The subject quoted above explained that some licensees 
are very creative in masking underreporting. “Of course,” he stated, “the 
licensor can take measures, such as hiring an independent auditing firm to 
check the books of licensees, but that costs a lot of money and takes quite 
some time. In countries with different business practices, it’s not always an 
easy job.”141 
The foregoing explains why, as one subject opined, “an outsider might 
be able to negotiate a higher rate, but not that much higher.”142 The head 
of licensing at a large technology company that has historically operated 
inside and outside of some large pools commented, “if the per-patent rate 
is too different from the per-patent pool rate, potential licensees would 
rather fight in court than take the license.”143 The subject added, “you may 
 
 137. Telephone Interview with Ruud Peters, supra note 118. 
 138. Telephone Interview with Subject #3, supra note 124. 
 139. Telephone Interview with Ruud Peters, supra note 118. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Telephone Interview with Subject #3, supra note 124. Here, the term “per-patent” 
was used casually and imprecisely. The speaker was referring to per-patent-family or per-
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deviate in practice from the baseline by 30 or 40% but not by 300% for 
example.”144 
This leads to another observation: the existence of a patent pool not only 
sets a baseline for negotiations, but also eliminates the need for an outsider 
to search for licensees and vice-versa—tasks that would contribute 
significantly to search costs in a world of one-to-one licenses. “We did a lot 
of their homework for them,” one pool administrator explained. 145  In 
summary, the very existence of the patent pool, in a sense, cuts down on 
both search costs and negotiation costs.146 This can help licensees to get a 
clear picture of which patents are essential to license.  
Interestingly, some research subjects explained that not all outsiders are 
holdouts seeking an economic advantage. Some are simply companies that 
have large, internal licensing staff who they wish to look out for by reserving 
work for them rather than going along with the pool.147 The company might 
view both options as equal in terms of the bottom line and yet the option to 
go it alone can keep their people employed. 
Finally, evidence gathered for this study shows that the decision to 
remain outside of a patent pool can raise the odds that a patent holder will 
need to litigate. As one research subject commented:  
You may also have to litigate more, even though patent pools are 
litigating sometimes. If you are alone, you will have to do more 
litigation, so you may have more, you know, bad press articles 
about you because these companies may also play with the media. 
Certain companies would hate to have to litigate by themselves.148  
The MPEG-2 case study that follows provides a vivid example of this risk. 
In summary, research subjects offered a surprising window into how 
patent pools limit the royalties that outside licensors can succeed in 
collecting. If the independent is a technology manufacturer, it typically must 
limit its demands if it wishes to use the patents in the pool (especially if it 
owes a contractual duty to grant-back). If the independent is not a licensee, 
the pool’s rate still is thought to be the basis in determining a reasonable 
royalty, either under a FRAND obligation or simply as a legal remedy. As 
one subject stated, “if the patent holder is not a pool licensee, his asking for 
 
invention rates. See supra notes 124, 125, and accompanying text (discussing the problem 
with looking to per-patent rates). 
 144. Telephone Interview with Subject #3, supra note 124. 
 145. Telephone Interview with Horn & Geary, supra note 116. 
 146. Id.  
 147. Telephone Interview with Subjects #12 and #13 (Feb. 23, 2017). 
 148. Telephone Interview with Subject #3, supra note 124. 
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high royalties will still be rejected by the licensees and his only solution for 
trying to get these will be litigation . . . with the associated risks.”149 Finally, 
even an outsider that gets licensees to agree to a high rate faces the problem 
of underreporting and an increased risk of litigation. One subject summed 
the situation up well: “if they want to get some money, then they need to be 
moderate.”150 
C. OUTSIDE THE MPEG-2 PATENT POOL (CASE STUDY) 
In the earliest days of filmmaking, about fifteen patents covered the 
technology needed to record and deliver movies to the public.151 These 
inventions covered flexible film, winding and spooling mechanisms, camera 
lenses, and related methods. In 1908, efforts to settle legal disputes between 
the two chief owners of these patents led to the formation of “The Motion 
Picture Patents Company”—the first of several patent pools that operated 
in the film industry of the early 20th century.152 
In the 1990s, the rise of digital video boosted not only the quality and 
transportability of movies but also the number of patent rights needed to 
play them. Many advances made it possible for celluloid and magnetic reels 
to be replaced by weightless computer instructions. One achievement, 
however, could be credited for the widespread adoption of digital video: the 
MPEG-2 video standard. Developed by (and named after) the Moving 
Picture Expert Group (MPEG) and a team of engineers and scientists from 
leading technology firms, MPEG-2 is a standardized way to describe 
motion, light, and sound through sequences of 1’s and 0’s. It is the language 
understood by DVD players, cable boxes, smart phones, digital cameras, 
online video providers, and video game consoles. 
MPEG took form at a January 1988 meeting of the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) and held its first meeting in May 
of that year.153 The group, which was open to any interested parties, held 
 
 149. Email from Subject #5 to author, supra note 122. 
 150. Telephone Interview with Ruud Peters, supra note 118. 
 151. The chief patents were U.S. Patent Nos. 12,192; 12,037; 629,063; 578,185; 
580,749; 586,953; 588,916; 673,992; 707,934; 722,382; 673,329; 744,251; 770,937; 
771,280; 785,205; and 785,237. See INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS AND TRUSTS 259–65 
(William S. Stevens ed., 1914) (listing the aforementioned patents).  
 152. See Ralph Cassady, Jr., Monopoly in Motion Picture Production and 
Distribution: 1908–1915, 32 S. CALIF. L. REV. 325, 329 (1959); see also Jeanne Thomas, 
The Decay of the Motion Picture Patents Company, 10 CINEMA J. 34, 34 (1971) 
(indicating that The Motion Picture Patents Company formed in 1908 by the emergence 
of two factions of the film industry).  
 153. See Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Public Policy Towards Patent Pools, in 8 
INNOVATION POLICY & THE ECONOMY 157, 174 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2008) (“The 
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frequent meetings which were widely attended by delegates of leading 
technology companies. MPEG required its participants to pledge to license 
any patents they might own related to the standard under development at 
FRAND terms—a fact that would later have important bearing on one of 
its outsiders.154 Over the course of a few years, at meetings held in Berlin, 
Australia, New York, Brussels, and Seoul, the MPEG-2 standard took 
form. The group produced a final draft in late 1994, and necessary 
stakeholders approved it in early 1995.155 
Although it took an ensemble of talented engineers to develop MPEG-
2, the way the technology works is easy to grasp156: movies, television, and 
other video are, of course, made up of sequences of still images. Thanks to 
a trick of human psychology, when viewed in rapid succession—twenty-
four frames per second for film, and thirty frames per second for television 
video—the images appear to move.157 Traditional analog movies create this 
illusion by storing thousands of images on film or magnetic tape and 
flashing them before the viewers’ eyes.158 As a practical matter, however, 
often only small areas of any frame in a sequence differ from the frame that 
immediately preceded it. Large swaths of a picture—the blue of a sky, or 
the green grass on a field, for instance—do not change. The information 
that matters most is what has changed between two successive frames. 
MPEG-2 cleverly takes advantage of this by formalizing a way to describe 
the portions of each image in a series that change from one frame to the 
next. The result is a phenomenally efficient method of compressing video, 
making for faster transfers over networks and more economical use of 
storage space on physical media.  
Shortly following MPEG-2’s completion in early 1995, one of the 
technology firms that helped develop the standard organized an internal 
 
standard was developed by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) under 
the leadership of Leonardo Chiariglione, along with scientists and engineers from many 
universities and corporations.”). 
 154. See id. at 174–75.  
 155. Lerner & Tirole, supra 153, at 174 (“The standard setting effort began in July 
1990, and the final MPEG-2 standard was approved in November 1994.”). 
 156. For more, see generally JAN VAN DER MEER, FUNDAMENTALS AND 
EVOLUTION OF MPEG-2 SYSTEMS: PAVING THE MPEG ROAD (2014) (discussing the 
development of MPEG-2). 
 157. Paul Backaus, The Illusion of Motion, PAULBAKAUS.COM (May 21, 2014), 
https://paulbakaus.com/tutorials/performance/the-illusion-of-motion/ [https://perma.cc/ 
A8RN-WACT]. 
 158. This effect is commonly referred to as “the persistence of vision.” See generally 
Bill Nichols & Susan J. Ledermann, Flicker and Motion in Film, in THE CINEMATIC 
APPARATUS 96 (Teresa de Lauretis & Stephen Heath eds., 1980). 
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working group, the purpose of which was to identify any relevant patents. 
With the help of lawyers and engineering consultants from over forty 
technology firms, the group identified and reviewed about 8,000 U.S. patent 
abstracts and about 800 patents, which had been assigned to over 100 patent 
owners.159 This work led to a consensus among the companies involved that 
they had found all (or nearly all) patents essential to MPEG-2.160 At its 
launch, the MPEG-2 License included 25 patent families consisting of 102 
essential patents. These covered many aspects of the standard, including 
spatial and temporal compression techniques, and methods of transmission. 
After identifying these patents, the group developed a set of agreements 
that defined a new patent pool. A new limited liability company, “MPEG 
LA,” was formed to administer licensing.161 The group invited holders of all 
essential patents to join and made the pool open to any future members that 
wished to include standards-essential patents that they owned.162 
In April 1997, MPEG LA and the individual patent holders that had 
joined the MPEG-2 pool—Columbia, Fujitsu, General Instrument, 
Lucent, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Philips, Scientific-Atlanta and Sony163—
submitted a letter to the Antitrust Division of the DOJ, requesting 
assurance that their planned pool did not violate the law or otherwise raise 
competition concerns. Two months later, on June 26, 1997, the DOJ 
responded favorably. Following a careful and lengthy analysis of the 
proposed pool, the letter concluded, “[i]t appears, however, that the 
 
 159. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 106, § 34.04[C] at 34–50 (“To determine which 
patents would be contributed to the pool, a number of firms participating in a ‘MPEG-2 
Intellectual Property Working Group’ hired an expert and invited submissions of patents 
that might be relevant to MPEG-2 compliance. The expert reviewed some 800 patents 
assigned to approximately 100 parties, and ultimately concluded that several of the patents 
were ‘essential’ to compliance with the MPEG-2 standard—meaning that there were no 
technological alternatives to the claimed technologies. Of the patents identified as essential, 
most (27) were contributed to the pool.”). 
 160. See Letter from Garrard R. Beeney, Sullivan & Cromwell, to Joel I. Klein, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 11 (Apr. 28, 1997), https://www.justice.gov/
archive/atr/public/busreview/request-letters/302637.pdf [https://perma.cc/4J5V-
AW5Y] (“[T]he proposed licensing arrangement includes most, but not all, MPEG-2 
essential patents.”); Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
to Gerrard R. Beeney, Sullivan & Cromwell (June 26, 1997), 
www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/busreview/215742.pdf [https://perma.cc/3753-L3P5] 
[hereinafter MPEG-2 Resonse Letter]. 
 161. See A History of Success–A Future in Innovation, MPEG LA, 
http://www.mpegla.com/main/Pages/AboutHistory.aspx [https://perma.cc/EA3M-
XZ33] (last visited Mar. 11, 2018). 
 162. Id. 
 163. See MPEG-2 Response Letter, supra note 160, at 2.  
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proposed arrangement will not raise any significant competitive 
concerns.”164 The MPEG-2 pool officially launched a short time later, on 
July 17, 1997. 
Around this time, an outsider emerged. Although Lucent collaborated 
on the pool and joined in signing the letter sent to the DOJ, it elected to 
license independently.165 Details of this decision are not well documented, 
but an interview subject directly involved in the pool offered a helpful 
account of when the news was relayed: “on the day of the announcement of 
the patent pool’s launch,” he explained, “Lucent told the other members of 
the group and MPEG LA that it planned not to join.”166 According to this 
subject, one reason for Lucent’s reluctance to join was their successful 
internal licensing capabilities. “Lucent was very well known for running a 
very strong and successful licensing program with their own portfolio which 
may have accounted for their decision,” this subject stated.167 According to 
Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole, Lucent’s decision came down to compensation: 
Lucent had a large internal licensing department with sufficient 
resources to conduct its own MPEG-2 licensing activities. 
Moreover, Lucent believed that two of its patents were most 
critical to the MPEG standard. Lucent felt that the licensing rate 
established by MPEG LA was lower than it could have been and 
decided not to join the pool. Lucent estimated that the higher 
royalty rates it would be able to charge by not joining the pool 
would more than offset the decreased fraction of the MPEG-2 
market that would license its technology if it pursued its own 
licensing activities.168 
Like Lucent, Thomson also initially refused to join to the pool, 
preferring to independently license its patents.169 As explained later in this 
case study and in the DVD case study that follows, however, it ultimately 
joined relatively early in the pool’s history, in July 2002.170 
The MPEG-2 pool’s royalty division formula treated all essential 
patents as equal in value—a view that may have not been shared by Lucent 
at the time.171 As an interview subject at MPEG LA explained, because any 
essential patent could block commercialization, all the patents arguably 
 
 164. See MPEG-2 Response Letter, supra note 160, at 10.  
 165. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 106, at 34–49. 
 166. Telephone Interview with Horn & Geary, supra note 116. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Lerner & Tirole, supra note 153, at 176. 
 169. Telephone Interview with Subject #3, supra note 124. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Telephone Interview with Subjects #12 and #13, supra note 147. 
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carried an equal value.172 “The patents included in this pool are all essential,” 
stated another subject, referring to debates about the issue among 
licensors.173 “I don’t think anyone can say that one patent is more essential 
than another, because you need them all. They are all blocking.”174 The 
subject went on to note, however, that “this was the first modern-day patent 
pool, and there were many who had reasons to be skeptical about its 
success.”175 
Lucent’s absence from the pool may have fostered some initial doubts 
in the market. As a subject at MPEG LA explained, “Lucent’s withdrawal 
added yet another element for them to be skeptical about.”176 According to 
this subject, MPEG LA allayed these concerns with a straightforward 
explanation of the value they were offering: 
We told [prospective licensees] that our program was voluntary 
and that Lucent had decided not to join. Despite this fact, we 
explained that the patents of the eight firms in the pool were 
essential, valuable, and worth paying for. We also explained that 
we were doing a lot of their homework for them because we were 
basically showing them the patent landscape they would otherwise 
have to research for themselves.177 
 “People accepted the license we offered with the eight [patent 
holders],” explained a research subject at MPEG LA, adding, “the eight, by 
the way, grew rapidly to about ten in about six months.”178 MPEG LA 
respected Lucent’s decision to go it alone but kept the door open for them 
to join anytime, “in the interest of including as much essential intellectual 
property as possible for the benefit of licensees,” a subject at MPEG LA 
explained, adding, “the extent to which the pool may have affected Lucent’s 
licensing efforts was not clear.”179 
Lucent was nevertheless steadfast in remaining an outsider. In March 
2003, Alcatel, a French telecommunications company joined the MPEG-2 
patent pool as a licensor.180 In April 2006, Lucent and Alcatel agreed on a 
 
 172. Id. 
 173. Telephone Interview with Horn & Geary, supra note 116. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Email from Horn & Geary, supra note 127. 
 180. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., No. CIV. 02-2060-B(CAB), 2007 WL 
2900484, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2007). 
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plan to merge their companies.181 Just two months later, with the merger 
underway, executives at Lucent realized that unless they acted fast, the 
company’s MPEG-2 patents would likely be included in the patent pool by 
virtue of Alcatel’s membership.182 (MPEG LA’s membership agreement 
required all members and their present or future “affiliates” to license 
essential patents to the pool.)183 To prevent this, Lucent established a trust 
in Delaware, which it named the Multimedia Patent Trust (MPT). 184 
Lucent was named as a beneficiary. 185  In November 2006, Lucent 
transferred its MPEG-2 essential patents to the trust.186  
Alcatel-Lucent then sued several computer hardware manufacturers for 
infringing the patents held in the trust. The defendant in one suit was 
Microsoft.187 There, Alcatel-Lucent filed a motion for summary judgment, 
holding that Microsoft’s implementation of the MPEG-2 video standard 
in its Xbox video game console was infringing.188 In response, Microsoft 
challenged the validity of the patents in the trust and argued for equitable 
estoppel based on Lucent’s commitment to license the patents to MPEG 
LA.189 Microsoft also argued in the alternative that even if the patents were 
valid, they were not essential to the MPEG-2 standard. 190  Microsoft 
argued, in other words, that the mere fact that its products abided by the 
MPEG-2 standard was not prima facie proof that it had infringed Lucent’s 
patents.191 Finally, Microsoft asserted a series of counterclaims of patent 
infringement against Lucent. 192  Ultimately, Alcatel-Lucent was 
unsuccessful on both fronts: the court held that the facts did not support a 
conclusion that Microsoft’s products infringed Lucent’s and did support 
Microsoft’s patent infringement claims.193 
 
 181. See id. at *1.  
 182. See id. at *2. 
 183. See id. at *4. 
 184. See id. at *2. 
 185. See id. at *6.  
 186. Id. The patents were U.S. Patent Nos. 4,958,226 and 4,383,272. 
 187. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 544 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (S.D. Cal. 2008). 
 188. See id. at 1087. 
 189. See id. at 1094, 1098. 
 190. See id. at 1102.  
 191. See id. at 1090–91.  
 192. See id. at 1096–1103. 
 193. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 06-CV-0684-H (CAB), 2008 WL 
2872738, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 23, 2008). 
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Matters grew worse for Alcatel-Lucent and MPT in 2007, when 
MPEG LA sued them for breach of contract in Delaware.194 The complaint 
alleged that Alcatel-Lucent had promised to license all MPEG-2 patents 
that it could—an obligation that MPEG LA argued Lucent had failed to 
fulfill when it transferred the patents to MPT. The complaint stated, “the 
only purpose of the transfer was to avoid Alcatel’s contractual commitment” 
in order “to extract additional royalties from MPEG-2 licensees.”195  
In late March, 2010, the suit settled—“literally in the middle of trial,” 
as one subject involved recounted.196 As described in a court filing, the 
settlement agreement required the MPT to subject the patents at issue in 
the Action pursuant to MPEG LA’s usual procedures for determination of 
whether any of them were “MPEG-2 Essential Patents” or “MPEG-2 
Systems Essential Patents.” 197  MPT agreed that if the patents were 
determined to be essential, it would join the pool.198 
Thomson, as mentioned earlier, had initially elected to keep its patents 
outside of the MPEG-2 pool. They joined long before the episode involving 
Alcatel-Lucent’s trust, however, in July 2002. 199  One research subject 
explained, “Technicolor [Thomson] was originally participating in 
discussions of the MPEG-2 Video patent pool, they stayed out and went as 
an independent. But later on, they experienced that they were not as 
successful as MPEG LA at sales, and they joined MPEG LA. So, they 
came back.”200 Another subject directly involved with the decision explained 
that Thomson joined because it was impressed by MPEG LA’s success in 
 
 194. Press Release, MPEG LA, MPEG LA Sues Alcatel Lucent for Breach of 
MPEG-2 Patent Pool Contractual Obligations (Nov. 5, 2007), 
http://www.mpegla.com/main/Pages/LegalAction.aspx [https://perma.cc/XD8N-P6P3].  
 195. Amended Verified Complaint ¶¶ 6–7, MPEG LA, L.L.C., v. Lucent, No. 3317-
VCL, (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 2010), 2010 WL 519600; see also Scott M. Fulton III, MPEG-
2 Patent Holder, Licensing Agent in High-Def Codec Dispute, BETANEWS (Nov. 6, 
2007), https://betanews.com/ 2007/11/06/mpeg-2-patent-holder-licensing-agent-in-
high-def-codec-dispute/ [https://perma.cc/JKD8-W9JV]. 
 196. Telephone Interview with Horn & Geary, supra note 116; see also Susan Beck, 
We Surrender! After Two Days, Alcatel-Lucent Waves the White Flag in Patent 
Showdown, AM. LAW. (Mar. 26, 2010, 12:00 AM), https://www.law.com/
americanlawyer/almID/1202446807481/ [https://perma.cc/Z2WF-PVB3]. 
 197. Press Release, MPEG LA, MPEG LA Lawsuit Against Alcatel Lucent Settled 
(Mar. 29, 2010), http://www.mpegla.com/main/Pages/LegalAction.aspx. 
 198. Id.; see also Exhibit A, Lucent Technologies, Multimedia Patent Trust v. 
Gateway, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. P 75977 (C.C.H.) (S.D. Cal, October 1, 2007), 2007 WL 
9431594. 
 199. Telephone Interview with Subject #3, supra note 124. 
 200. Telephone Interview with Subject #2 (July 15, 2017) (on file with author). 
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its early years.201 Interestingly, Thomson’s need to become a pool licensee 
may have also factored into their decision to join. “Thomson needed to 
become in its own right a licensee,” added another subject.202 “They made a 
lot of set-top boxes in that era, and they used MPEG-2. The good news is 
that Thomson became a licensee.”203 
As for Lucent, staying outside of the MPEG-2 pool appears to have 
been a costly strategy. According to multiple subjects interviewed, Lucent 
was unable to collect royalties that were appreciably higher than what they 
would have received as a member of the pool.204 This was because the pool 
provided a signal to licensees of what the value of the patents relating to the 
technology was.205 Licensees apparently reasoned that, because any essential 
patent could block commercialization, all patents were approximately equal 
in value. 206  Meanwhile, by suing licensees of the pool, Alcatel-Lucent 
exposed itself to counterclaims that led to findings of patent infringement 
on its part.207 The same court’s finding that Lucent had not been infringed 
upon, meanwhile, raised fresh questions about the essentiality of some of 
Lucent’s patents.208 Added to all of this was Lucent’s opportunity cost. “In 
the period between 1997 when they decided to join and 2010 when this 
lawsuit forced them to join,” explained an interview subject, “they left huge 
amounts of money on the table. Because you can’t go back to get royalties 
that you missed when you should have been in the pool. Because that money 
 
 201. Telephone Interview with Subject #3, supra note 124. 
 202. Telephone Interview with Horn & Geary, supra note 116. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Telephone Interview with Subjects #12 and #13, supra note 147. Consistently, 
the court found no evidence that Alcatel-Lucent had demanded “supracompetitive” prices, 
arguing that this was just attorney speculation. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., No. 
CIV. 02-2060-B(CAB), 2007 WL 2900484, at *17 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2007). This is 
consistent with the accounts laid out earlier, that Lucent was unable to use its outsider 
status to demand supracompetitive prices. See id.  
 205. Telephone Interview with Horn & Geary, supra note 116. 
 206. This conclusion was drawn generally from discussions with interviewees. 
 207. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 544 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1120 (S.D. Cal. 
2008). 
 208. Steven Reynolds, Setting the Record Straight on Upcoming Patent Rights Trial, 
LUCENT-ALCATEL CEO BLOGS (Mar. 2010) (“That court decided that the MPT patents 
were not infringed by Microsoft’s MPEG2 products. Obviously, and as is clarified by 
Bloomberg through its correction, Alcatel-Lucent can’t be risking something that a court 
already determined that the MPT is not entitled to receive. The amount quoted is 
completely unrelated to the current trial.”). 
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goes out the door to licensors.”209 In the end, all of Lucent’s patents ended 
up in the pool.210 
D. OUTSIDE THE DVD PATENT POOLS (CASE STUDY)211 
In the late 1980s, the ascendance of digital music CDs over cassette 
tapes set the stage commercially and technologically for Digital Versatile 
Disc (DVD) technology.212 Although analog systems that stored and played 
back movies from optical discs had existed since the late 1970s, none were 
widely adopted in the United States.213 As a result, through the early 1990s, 
most Americans owned a VHS player—a device that played movies stored 
in analog form on cumbersome cartridges of magnetically charged tape.214 
When it was introduced in the late 1990s, DVD marked a leap ahead in 
quality and convenience, offering full-length movies in the then-new 
MPEG-2 format on elegant plastic discs the same size as CDs.215 Although 
it was eventually usurped by high-definition Blu-Ray discs and streaming 
video, DVD was a commercial giant during its reign: by 2006, about eighty-
one percent of American homes had a DVD player, a figure that surpassed 
that of VCR player ownership in that year.216 The Microsoft Xbox and Sony 
PlayStation—two dominant videogame consoles of the 1990s and 2000s—
 
 209. Telephone Interview with Horn & Geary, supra note 116. 
 210. Id. 
 211. This discussion pertains specifically to DVD Video and not recordable DVD 
media. For more information about recordable DVD standards, see Stephan Gauch, + vs Ǧ
: Dynamics and Effects of Competing Standards of Recordable DVD-Media, in THE 
DYNAMICS OF STANDARDS 47 (Tineke M. Egyedi & Knut Blind eds., 2008). 
 212. See JIM TAYLOR, DVD DEMYSTIFIED 38 (2d ed. 2001) (“It was not until the 
development of compact disc digital audio in the 1980s that optical media again proved its 
worth in the world of bits and bytes, setting the stage for DVD.”). 
 213. Julie Flaherty, Bittersweet Times for Collectors of Laser Disc Movies, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 29, 1999), https://nyti.ms/2v7Gk1e [https://perma.cc/K7YR-NU92] 
(commenting on the success of DVD). One subject for this Article stated, “[l]aser discs 
with movies . . . did not have success on the market. Many companies thought before the 
launch of DVD that DVD would not take off. It has been a good surprise for everyone.” 
See email from Alfred Chaouat, Senior Vice President of Licensing, Technicolor, to author 
(July 24, 2017). 
 214. See generally TAYLOR, supra note 212, at 19, 24–37 (discussing the history of 
VHS and other video technology and reporting that 87% of all U.S. households owning at 
least one VCR as of the book’s publication date, which was 1998). 
 215. See id. at 60–70 (discussing the introduction of DVD players in the United 
States). 
 216. See, e.g., DVD Players Overtake VCRs, CNN MONEY (Dec. 26, 2006, 9:34 
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2006/12/26/technology/dvd_vcr [https://perma.cc/VT9L-
EJEP]. 
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also relied upon the DVD format for game data.217 This success resulted 
from the work of two patent pools, one lone licensor, and many 
manufacturers who licensed from all three. 
Warren Lieberfarb, former President of Warner Home Video, is widely 
credited for his instrumental role in encouraging the development of the 
DVD standard.218 During his distinguished career working at leading film 
production companies—first as a financial analyst and later as a senior 
executive—Mr. Lieberfarb was, according to former colleagues, deeply 
intrigued by the idea of a digital video disc for decades.219 He encouraged 
Toshiba to develop a prototype of the technology, which was demonstrated 
to electronics companies and industry stakeholders in 1994. 220  Despite 
initial skepticism, the film and technology industries came to support the 
development of a new standard, thanks in large part to Mr. Lieberfarb’s 
lobbying. 221  After further research and experimentation, two teams 
composed of leading technology firms emerged with the most promising 
solutions: Philips and Sony co-developed a format it called “Multimedia 
CD” or “MMCD”; 222  Toshiba, meanwhile, asked Hitachi, Matsushita 
(Panasonic), Mitsubishi, Victor (JVC), Pioneer, and Thomson to help it 
 
 217. See, e.g., Steve Traiman, It’s All in the Games, BILLBOARD MAG., Mar. 31, 
2001, at 62, 69 (noting that Nintendo’s Gamecube console relied on a variant of DVD that 
used discs with smaller diameters). 
 218. See, e.g., Martin Dale, Warren Lieberfarb: The History of DVD and Cable 
Networks Highlights the Tremendous Value of Classic Films, VARIETY (Oct. 12, 2014, 
11:08 AM) (“Warren Lieberfarb is universally recognised as the ‘architect of the DVD’ . . 
. .”), http://variety.com/2014/film/global/warren-lieberfarb-the-history-of-dvd-and-
cable-networks-highlights-the-tremendous-value-of-classic-films-1201328060/ 
[https://perma.cc/6RN8-Z7MH]; James Greenberg, Private Sector; The Would-Be King 
of DVD, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/24/business/
private-sector-the-would-be-king-of-the-dvd.html [https://perma.cc/9KWV-F7AW] 
(reporting that many in the film industry credit Lieberfarb “with dreaming, cajoling and 
bullying the DVD into existence”). Similarly, a research subject for this study emphasized 
Lieberfarb’s importance in bringing about the DVD. See email from Alfred Chaouat to 
author, supra note 213. 
 219. See Greenberg, supra note 218 (quoting the former executive of AOL Time 
Warner as saying that Mr. Lieberfarb’s focus on the DVD was “the most consuming 
manifestation I’ve ever seen in an individual”). 
 220. Id. 
 221. See TAYLOR, supra note 212, at 37–39 (noting that optical discs rely on a method 
of storing information through the use of divots to represent bits, a principle understood 
since Charles Babbage’s seminal work in developing digital programmable computers).  
 222. See id. at 40–60; Letter from Garrard R. Beeney, Sullivan & Cromwell, to Joel I. 
Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (July 29, 1998), https://www.justice.gov/
atr/page/file/1020341/download [https://perma.cc/8SGD-ZDVW] [hereinafter DVD3C 
Request Letter]. 
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further develop its 1994 prototype.223 This work led to a format the group 
called the “Super Disc” or “SD.” 224  Anxious about the possibility of a 
wasteful format war like the one that slowed the adoption of VHS over a 
decade earlier, Apple, Microsoft, Sun Microsystems, Dell, and other 
manufacturers, urged these two teams to combine.225  
Cooperation came in 1995, but it would be short-lived. Sony and 
Philips agreed to join the “SD” group to work on a single format that would 
incorporate elements of both the MMCD and the SD formats.226 The 
collaborators agreed to call the new format the DVD. 227  Notably, this 
development work was not mediated by a standard-setting organization, but 
instead, was largely a private venture that operated under the auspices of 
“The DVD Consortium” (later renamed “The DVD Forum”). 228  As a 
result, details of the DVD standard were kept confidential and available 
only to licensees who signed a nondisclosure agreement.229 Two subjects 
directly involved independently confirmed that participants in the DVD 
Forum were subject to a FRAND obligation, however. 230  The group 
finalized the first DVD specification in late 1995.231  
 
 223. Email from Alfred Chaouat to author, supra note 213. 
 224. Letter from Carey R. Ramos et al., Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison 
to Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice 6 (Oct. 9, 
1998), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/01/08/302365.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/269A-WBFT] [hereinafter DVD6C Request Letter]; see also 
Electronic Giants Battle On, NEXT GENERATION, Nov. 1995, at 19 (discussing the battle 
between MMCD and the SD formats).  
 225. See TAYLOR, supra note 212, at 48–49 (discussing reconciliation between the two 
camps). 
 226. See id. 
 227. See id. at 50. 
 228. Id.; Telephone Interview with Alfred Chaouat, Senior Vice President of 
Licensing, Technicolor (July 19, 2017) (explaining the change in name). 
 229. Discussing the DVD standard, one research subject emphasized the difference 
between “technical essentiality” and “commercial essentiality.” The former, the subject 
explained, relates to patents that are necessarily infringed by any device that follows a 
standard; the latter, by contrast, describes patents that are infringed by devices that follow 
the standard in a manner that makes the device commercially desirable or cost effective. 
Telephone Interview with Horn & Geary, supra note 116 (“There’s a lot of mechanical 
stuff in a DVD player. So, let’s say the standard recites that you have to be able to jump 
across ten tracks within a certain number of milliseconds but it doesn’t specify how you 
could do that. There may be many ways you could actuate the system to make that jump, 
some of which are preferable to the manufacturer. Those practices may be commercially 
essential.”). 
 230. Telephone Interview with Subject #2, supra note 200; email from Alfred Chaouat 
to author, supra note 213. 
 231. See TAYLOR, supra note 212, at 51.  
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The collaborators wished to pool their patents under a single license, 
but they were unable to come to an agreement. At a June 1996 DVD 
conference, speakers announced that the ten companies had agreed to form 
a patent pool in order to streamline licensing.232 “The goal was to form one 
pool,” stated one subject directly involved.233 On August 2, 1996, Sony and 
Philips announced that they would begin licensing their patents jointly and 
invited the other eight companies to join in.234 Pioneer later joined Sony 
and Philips, and the three companies formed a pool called the “DVD3C 
Licensing Group.”235 Six of the remaining companies formed a pool they 
called the “DVD6C Licensing Group.”236 Thomson, meanwhile, decided to 
license independently.237 
A research subject directly involved with the attempt to form a single 
pool commented, “ultimately, the goal of a single pool failed because various 
groups had different views as to how to share the royalties.”238 This subject 
went on to explain that “the fundamental difference was whether the 
royalties should be divided on a per-patent basis only or should also take 
into account the total contribution of a party to the optical technology 
concerned.”239 Another subject with knowledge of the episode commented, 
“frankly, they couldn’t agree on royalties. That was the problem. They were 
never able to get there.”240 Yet another individual involved explained:  
The discussions for formation of a potential pool including all 
DVD Forum companies took many months, did not reach a 
consensus and finally led to the formation of two separate pools . 
. . in great part because Philips would not accept to decrease its 
share in the intended pool. Thomson decided that it was better off 
financially, and as a respected licensor, to continue to license its 
patents separately, in a single license incorporating all 
technologies used in the DVD player.241 
For its part, Thomson appears to have had a few reasons for remaining 
independent. A research subject explained that in part, the company viewed 
certain patents it held as having special value: 
 
 232. See id. at 54. 
 233. Telephone Interview with Subject #2, supra note 200. 
 234. See TAYLOR, supra note 212, at 56. 
 235. See generally DVD3C Request Letter, supra note 222 (describing the pool). 
 236. DVD6C Request Letter, supra note 224 (describing the pool). 
 237. Telephone Interview with Subject #3, supra note 124. 
 238. Telephone Interview with Subject #2, supra note 200. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Telephone Interview with Horn & Geary, supra note 116. 
 241. Email from Subject #5 to author, supra note 122. 
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All essential patents in a patent pool have, in general, the same 
value. At that time, Thomson still owned some fundamental 
patents addressing the way the pits are read by an optical laser 
beam, which, from our perspective, was much more valuable than 
the DVD essential patents dealing with the multi-angle view, for 
example. So, we decided not to join any of the DVD patent 
pools.242 
In addition to this, however, Thomson felt the most comfortable 
working with its own licensing staff purely because very few other 
companies involved in the pools had a long track record for this kind of 
work. The research subject continued: 
Another reason why Thomson did not join the 6C patent pool is 
the uncertainty about who would be the agent. We knew that 
Philips had great experience and talent through their joint CD 
licensing program with Sony. We were not so sure if the other 6C 
pool members had the ability to manage a patent pool well, 
however. Also, we were already managing our own successful CD 
player licensing program. The decision to join a pool has to do 
with the rate and your share of it, but also how you assess the 
capabilities of the licensing agents. Licensing agents are not all 
equal.243 
As a result, manufacturers of DVD players would need to obtain 
essential patent licenses from both pools and Thomson. 
Despite the fragmentation, the three licensors requested royalties that 
resulted in roughly comparable royalty rates relative to the number of 
patent-families or inventions licensed. In a letter requesting review and 
approval from the DOJ, for instance, the 3C licensing group (Philips, Sony, 
and Pioneer) stated that their pool would contain 115 DVD player 
patents.244 Based on discussions with a subject involved and a review of 
essentiality lists, this figure refers to patent families, each of which may have 
included individual patents granted in different countries and some 
divisionals as well.245 The 3C pool stated that it would charge DVD player 
 
 242. Email from Alfred Chaouat to author, supra note 213. This subject went on to 
note that Thomson spearheaded an important Blu-Ray patent licensing pool, however, and 
emphasized that the decision to join or pool or remain independent is done “one a case-
by-case basis.” 
 243. Telephone Interview with Alfred Chaouat, supra note 228. 
 244. See DVD Business Review Letter, supra note 100, at 4 (“[T]here are 115 patents 
in all for the manufacture of DVD players, and 95 for the manufacture of the discs 
themselves.”).  
 245. Email from Alfred Chaouat to author, supra note 213; see also Licensing: DVD-
Video/ ROM Disc (Joint), PHILLIPS, http://www.ip.philips.com/licensing/program/29/
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manufacturers 3.5% of net sales with a minimum of $7 per unit sold, which 
would drop to $5 per unit sold beginning in the year 2000.246 Because most 
DVD players sold for under $200, the minimum dollar rates were the most 
important after several years.247 Before the year 2000, the 3C pool collected 
a per-patent-family rate of about $0.06.248 From the year 2000 onward, the 
pool yielded a per-patent-family rate of about $0.043 for each player.249 The 
DOJ replied favorably on December 16, 1998, stating that the 3C pool 
raised no antitrust concerns.250 With these assurances, the DVD3C pool 
began offering licenses soon after. 
The 6C group (Hitachi, Matsushita, Time Warner, Toshiba, and 
others) submitted a request for business review to the DOJ at around the 
same time, on October 9, 1998.251 They would license forty-four DVD 
player patents at a rate of 4% of net sales per player, with a minimum of $4 
per player.252 This figure refers to patent families, each of which may have 
included individual patents granted in different countries and divisionals as 
well.253 Again, because DVD player prices were generally low enough, it is 
safe to assume that the minimum price per player was the most relevant. 
Based on this, the DVD6C group collected per-patent-family rates of 
approximately $0.09 for players. The DOJ responded favorably on June 10, 
1999.254 “By reducing what would otherwise be six licensing transactions to 
 
dvd-video-rom-disc-joint [https://perma.cc/6TXR-8UQ4] (last visited Mar. 11, 2018) 
(offering a list of patents granted in different countries). 
 246. See DVD3C Request Letter, supra note 222. 
 247. Telephone Interview with Ruud Peters, supra note 118. For a more detailed view 
of these numbers, see the tables and accompanying discussion infra Section IV.B. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Interestingly, the DOJ addressed the outsider concern in its response, although 
not with respect to the two DVD pools or Thomson. Instead, it discussed the possibility 
that a member of the DVD3C pool might refuse, at some future time, to license essential 
patents it might acquire—outsiderism by an insider, as it were. The DOJ did not believe 
this would seriously dampen the efficiencies of the pool. See DVD3C Response Letter, 
supra note 244, at 14 n.58 (“Transaction costs to licensees would almost certainly be 
somewhat lower if these later patents were included in the pool, instead of being subject to 
separate negotiations. However, the fact that this pool might not enable the realization of 
all potential efficiencies of pooling patents in this area does not mean that the efficiencies 
that it does create are insubstantial or that the arrangement is anticompetitive or 
unlawful.”). 
 251. See DVD6C Request Letter, supra note 224. 
 252. Id. at Exhibit 2 (on file with the author) (listing the forty-four patents). 
 253. Id. at 13. 
 254. See Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Carey 
R. Ramos, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison (June 10, 1999), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2012/08/01/2485.pdf. 
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one,” the DOJ wrote, “the pool would reduce transactions costs for 
Licensors and licensees alike. By ensuring that each Licensor’s patents will 
not be blocked by those of the other five, the pool would enhance the value 
of all six Licensors’ patents.”255 In the DOJ’s view, it seemed that some 
cooperation was better than none. 
This leads to Thomson. According to a subject directly involved, prior 
to July 2002, Thomson licensed both its MPEG-2 and DVD patents 
independently. 256  At that time, the rate it charged DVD player 
manufacturers for both sets of patents was $1.7 for each DVD player sold.257 
In July 2002, Thomson decided to join the MPEG-2 patent pool, as 
discussed earlier,258 and it lowered the rate of its DVD patents to 1.3% of 
the net selling price of each player, with a minimum of $1.3 per unit.259 
Thomson’s portfolio included 10 essential patent families.260 As with the 
two pools, each patent family included numerous patents filed in different 
countries as well as divisionals.261 At a rate of $1.3 per sale, this equated to 
a per-patent-family rate of $0.13. 
Although this effective per-patent-family rate is higher than that of the 
3C and 6C pools, a research subject explained that some licensees who held 
patents Thomson wished to license paid Thomson lower rates. “We 
concluded some bilateral licenses (i.e., including a license back for 
Thomson) at a lower rate than the standard rate when the licensee owned 
relevant DVD patents that we were using in our products. Otherwise, we 
succeeded to license our patents at the standard rate.”262 This comment 
connected with an opinion shared by another research subject, who stated,  
You need to understand that this is the asking price. In bilateral 
negotiations there’s always a difference between the asking price 
and the price you finally settle on—a negotiation margin. When 
you have a pool, by contrast, you always have a fixed rate.263  
 
[https://perma.cc/23X3-S793] [hereinafter DVD6C Response Letter] (responding 
favorably to the proposed pool).  
 255. Id. 
 256. Telephone Interview with Research Subject #3, supra note 228. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Press Release, Thomson Multimedia, Thomson Joins MPEG LA Patent Pool 
(July 11, 2002), www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/vprr/0204/02048954.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WNS2-EMC3]. 
 259. Telephone Interview with Alfred Chaouat, supra note 228. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Email from Alfred Chaouat to author, supra note 213. 
 263. Telephone Interview with Subject #2, supra note 200. 
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The per-patent-family rates for players collected by all three licensors 
were not vastly different in part because there was a mutual awareness that 
the aggregate cost for licensees could not be too high. Simply put, the 
licensors set their royalties in light of one another. The DVD6C pool 
signaled this when it wrote to the DOJ, “[t]he royalty rates proposed by the 
DVD pool are reasonable, especially when compared to the rates proposed 
by the MPEG-2 pool for patents used in DVD products or when compared 
to the rates proposed by the Sony/Philips/Pioneer 3-party DVD pool.”264 
When asked if this showed that the 6C group looked to the 3C group for a 
baseline, a research subject directly involved commented, “I think that is a 
reasonable conclusion.”265 A licensing expert directly involved with licensing 
at Thomson also explained, “Thomson’s rate was set based on the rates set 
up by the two DVD patent pools.”266 In short, there was signaling among 
the two pools and Thomson. 
A 2004 dispute in the District of Delaware involving the 6C pool 
illustrates the willingness of licensees to push back against independent rates 
they perceive as unreasonable in light of pool rates. Matsushita Electrical 
Industrial Co. v. Cinram International, Inc. involved a company that sought 
to license certain DVD disc patents directly from the individual members 
of the 6C pool.267 The pooling agreement allowed the companies to do this. 
The licensee was upset, however, because the per-patent-family rate 
requested by each licensor outsider of the pool was higher than the per-
patent-family rate that the pool offered. 
Cinram maintains that the structure of the 6C Pool discourages 
individual licenses because such licenses would undercut the pool 
price. . . . Cinram explains that the cost for individual licenses 
from four of the six 6C Pool members totaled $0.11. Cinram 
points out that this total substantially exceeds the $0.05 per disc 
royalty that it currently pays for a 6C Pool License, thereby 
making individual licenses entirely impractical.268 
Interestingly, the District of Delaware rejected this argument based on 
its finding that the rates charged by the pool fell well below the “objective 
value” of the patents.269 
 
 264. DVD6C Request Letter, supra note 224, at 20. 
 265. Telephone Interview with Subject #2, supra note 200. 
 266. Email from Alfred Chaouat to author, supra note 213. 
 267. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Cinram Int’l, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 370 (D. 
Del. 2004). 
 268. Id. at 378. 
 269. Id. at 379 (“The Second Circuit has stated that the only valid test to prove that an 
alternative is too costly to be a realistic alternative is whether the price for such a license, 
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The DVD licensing story fails to support the theory that outsiders will 
ask for royalties so excessive that licensees will be unable to bear the 
aggregate cost. Rather, in line with the MPEG-2 story, this episode seems 
to show that the pricing information published by patent pools (i.e., royalty 
rate announcements) sets a baseline for negotiations that take place outside 
of the pool and even rates charged by complementary pools. As explored in 
Part IV, this spillover benefit may be viewed as an unappreciated benefit of 
patent pools. 
IV. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF OUTSIDERS 
The foregoing study shows that the royalty rates set by patent pools tend 
to limit the royalty rates that outsiders ask for and receive. This finding 
directly conflicts with the theory that outsiders will tend to undermine the 
benefits of patent pools. This is not to say, however, that the rate charged 
by outsiders and secondary pools is not relatively higher than the rate 
collected by individual members in a pool. In the DVD episode, for 
instance, some licensors collected relatively more than others. Should the 
higher relative rates in such settings be viewed as an “outsider premium?” 
To aid regulators, this Part introduces a technique for estimating the cost 
that a licensee either incurs or saves in the presence of an outsider. This 
technique is then applied to real-world financial and industry data collected 
in the foregoing study. The results indicate that, surprisingly, licensees may 
pay less in settings where cooperation among licensors is slightly 
fragmented than they would pay in a setting where outsiders were induced 
to join a single pool. 
A. A METHOD FOR ESTIMATING OUTSIDER COSTS AND BENEFITS 
Do licensees pay more when outsiders are present than they would pay 
to a unified pool? This question asks one to compare reality as it is to a 
hypothetical world where no outsiders or secondary pools exist—i.e., a 
grand coalition where all relevant patent holders are joined. Evidence 
 
in an objective sense, is higher than the value of the intellectual property rights being 
conveyed. In accord with this reasoning, the court concludes that the per disc royalty 
differential only causes the individual licensing option to be an unrealistic alternative if it 
is higher than the value of the DVD rights conveyed. The court finds that the facts at bar 
do not show this to be the case.”) (internal citations omitted); Buffalo Broad. Co. v. Am. 
Soc. of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 744 F.2d 917, 927 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Even if the 
blanket license is objectively the ‘better buy’ for most users, the program license would be 
a realistic alternative so long as it was fairly priced for those who might find it preferable 
for reasons other than price. But if the program license were available only at a price beyond 
any objectively reasonable range, the ‘bargain’ nature of the blanket license would not 
immunize it from characterization as a restraint.”).  
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presented in the foregoing case studies indicates this is an unrealistic ideal, 
of course. Some outsiders simply prefer to go it alone, sometimes for 
idiosyncratic reasons. Unrealistic as it may be, however, a grand coalition 
hypothetical allows for a head-on quantitative assessment of the outsider 
concern. The following discussion presents a method of comparing the costs 
that a licensee incurs in settings with and without outsiders. 
The greatest challenge in developing a picture of a grand coalition is 
determining what total royalty rate such a patent pool would charge 
licensees. Research subjects confirmed that the royalty rate set by a patent 
pool strikes a balance between what it takes to retain licensors and to offer 
reasonable terms to licensees over the course of a license.270 Recall from Part 
II of this Article that the amount licensors receive in most modern pools is 
determined by a formula, rather than through individual deals with each 
licensor who joins.271 Earlier scholarship has shown that nearly all patent 
pools, historical and contemporary, have adopted this “rough and ready” 
approach to royalty divisions.272 The two most common methods pools use 
to apportion royalties are “per-capita” and “per-patent.”273 Many patent 
pools use combinations of these two approaches as well.274 As a research 
subject for this Article explained, some pools will divide, say, twenty percent 
of their incoming royalties equally among the patent owners and the 
remaining eighty percent may be divided based upon the number of patents 
each member has licensed.275 A subject explained that a problem with a 
simple “per-patent” approach is that it encourages members of the pool to 
file many “divisional” patent applications relating to just one invention 
because doing so increases the raw number of patents upon which members’ 
royalties are based.276 To remedy this issue, subjects explained, some recent 
pools have limited the number of patents that may be included in per-patent 
calculations, either by limiting the number of divisionals to be counted, or 
basing the division not on the raw number of patents but instead on the 
number of patent families contributed by a licensor.277 In light of these 
observations, a foundational assumption in this exercise is that a patent pool 
that includes all relevant patents will include a royalty-division formula of 
some kind.  
 
 270. Email from Subject #11 (July 27, 2017) (on file with author). 
 271. Mattioli, supra note 12, at 439–55. 
 272. See id. at 462. 
 273. See id. at 446–47. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Telephone Interview with Subject #8 (July 15, 2017) (on file with author); email 
from Alfred Chaouat to author, supra note 213. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
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This leads to a second assumption: in order to entice all outsiders to join 
as members, a grand coalition would need to deliver to all outsiders royalties 
that are at least as great as those they can already collect outside of the pool. 
One could argue quite fairly that perhaps a slightly lower rate than this 
would be enough to entice some outsiders to join, in light of the transaction 
cost savings that patent holders enjoy by belonging to pools. On the other 
hand, this study has revealed that most outsiders enjoy the efficiencies of 
robust internal licensing departments. For this reason, it is difficult to guess 
whether an outsider would be willing to give up some of its royalty returns 
in exchange for the efficiencies of belonging to a pool, and if so, how much. 
For these reasons, this exercise proceeds on the assumption that, to induce 
all licensors to join, a single pool must deliver to the highest-paid outsider 
royalties at least as great as those that outsider could draw on its own. 
As a threshold matter, then, it is necessary to determine who the 
highest-paid licensor is and how much that licensor collects for each 
product that its licensees sell. In the course of conducting the studies in this 
Article, I received directly from research subjects and documentary sources 
a wealth of industry pricing data as well as the royalty rates charged by 
patent pools and individual licensors. In the practical example that follows, 
data from the DVD licensing industry are presented. 
To aid in this analysis, it is helpful to represent the foregoing 
assumptions as equations. Equation 1, below, shows the total per-licensee 
royalty rate that a patent pool using a per-capita royalty division formula 
would need to charge in order to bring in an outsider that collects a per-
licensee rate of “RateOutsider.” Here, n represents the total number of 
patent holders in the pool.  
 
Equation 1: Royalty Rate Charged by Unified Pool Using Per-Capita Formula 
ܴܽݐ݁ܲܥ ൌ ܴܽݐܱ݁ݑݐݏ݅݀݁ݎ ൈ ሺ݊ ൅ ͳሻ 
 
This equation assumes that a patent pool is driven strictly by a royalty 
division formula and that it has not made a special agreement that has 
resulted in compensating the outsider more, comparatively, than the other 
members. This assumption might be challenged, but it seems reasonable, as 
existing members of a pool would likely disfavor disproportionately 
benefiting a reluctant member. For comparison, Equation 2, below, shows 
the total per-licensee royalty rate (“RatePP”) under a per-patent approach. 
Here, “NumInside” is the number of patents in the pool before the outsider 
joins, “RateOutsider” is the royalty rate the highest-paid outsider draws, and 
“NumOutside” is the number of relevant patents owned by that outsider. 
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Equation 2: Royalty Rate Charged by Unified Pool Using Per-Patent Formula 
ܴܽݐ݁ܲܲ ൌ ሺܴܽݐܱ݁ݑݐݏ݅݀݁ݎȀܲܽݐ݁݊ݐݏܱݑݐݏ݅݀݁ݎሻ ൈ ሺܰݑ݉ܫ݊ݏ݅݀݁ 
൅ܰݑܱ݉ݑݐݏ݅݀݁ሻ 
 
To calculate the royalty rate that would be charged by a unified pool 
that uses a combination of the per-capita and per-patent approach, one can 
multiply the “RatePP” and “RatePC” values by their relative weights (e.g., 
20% and 80%) and take the sum. The sum is referred to below as 
“RateHypo.” 
Next, one can compare these hypothetical rates to the royalty rate that 
licensees pay all licensors in reality. This latter amount, represented by 
“RateActual” below, can be derived by adding the individual rates charged 
by each pool and each licensor. The difference between these values is a 
licensee’s total royalty cost or savings by working with a single pool as 
opposed to working with a pool and one or more outsiders. 
 
Equation 3: Calculation of Rate Increase Due to Outsider Inclusion in Pool 
ܴܽݐ݁ܲݎ݁݉݅ݑ݉ ൌ ܴܽݐ݁ܪݕ݌݋ െ ܴܽݐ݁ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ 
 
It is also necessary to consider transaction costs. For a licensee, working 
with a single pool involves just one transaction, compared to the multiple 
transactions necessary to work with, say, two pools and an outsider. The 
transaction costs conserved (“TCostsSaved”) by working with a unified 
pool, or grand coalition (“TCostsGC”), instead of a partial coalition 
involving multiple pools and outsiders (“TCostsPC”) can be represented as 
follows: 
 
Equation 4: Transaction costs conserved under unified pool (per-licensee) 
ܶܥ݋ݏݐݏܵܽݒ݁݀ ൌ ܶܥ݋ݏݐݏܲܥ െ ܶܥ݋ݏݐݏܩܥ 
 
Bringing this all together, one can determine the total increase or 
decrease in cost to each licensee (“OutsiderPremium” below) by subtracting 
the transaction costs conserved by the rate increase incurred: 
 
Equation 5: Calculation of Outsider Premium 
ܱݑݐݏ݅݀݁ݎܲݎ݁݉݅ݑ݉ ൌ ܴܽݐ݁ܲݎ݁݉݅ݑ݉ െ ܶܥ݋ݏݐݏܵܽݒ݁݀ 
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If “OutsiderPremium” is positive, then licensees are better off under 
current conditions (licensing from the pool and outsider) than they would 
be if the outsider were induced to join the pool; if “OutsiderPremium” is 
negative, then licensees should wish for the pool to raise its rates to induce 
the outsider or outsiders to join. 
Ultimately, the analysis boils down to comparing two numbers: the costs 
licensees incur in reality against those they would incur in a setting with a 
single pool that has raised its rates to pull in outsiders. 
B. ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF OUTSIDERS ON DVD LICENSEES 
This discussion applies real-world financial and patent data gathered 
from the study in Part III to the method described in the preceding 
discussion. The result is a rough estimate of the impact, in cost, of outsiders 
on DVD licensees. The results are surprising: arguably, licensees fare better 
in the slightly fragmented licensing landscape that exists than they would in 
a setting with a single pool. The implications of this conclusion are explored 
further toward the end of this Article. 
Drawing upon the study in Part III, the table below lists the number of 
patent families and royalty rates charged by DVD patent holders. Although 
research subjects indicated that outsiders such as Thomson sometimes 
agreed to accept rates lower than the rates they asked for, this study will rely 
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$7 before yr. 2000 
$5 after yr. 2000 





44 minimum: $4 







(alt: 1.3% NSP) 
$0.13 
 
In addition to the minimum per-patent-family royalty rates that appear 
in Table 1, it is helpful to determine the actual per-patent-family royalty 
rates for years in which the minimum did not apply. As Table 1 shows, all 
licensors based their royalty rates on a percentage of the net selling price 
(NSP) of a DVD player until that percentage fell below a certain number—
$100 in the cases of DVD6C and Thomson. Drawing upon sales data 
published by the Consumer Electronics Association, Table 2 reflects the 
patent royalties a licensor would have collected from each licensor for an 
average-priced DVD player in the years 1997–2004.279 This range of years 






 278. NSP signifies “Net Selling Price.” This is shown as an alternate measure of 
royalties owned. If the percentage shown in the table multiplied by a product’s NSP exceeds 
the minimum, the higher number was owed. Looking to the first row for example, if a 
DVD player was sold in the year 2001 for $250, then 3.5% of this would have equaled 
$8.75. Licensees would have owed this sum because it is higher than the minimum of $5 
listed for that time. 
 279. See Cost of DVD Players, DATA360, http://www.data360.org/dsg.aspx?Data_
Set_Group_Id=497 [https://perma.cc/65T8-87PX] (last updated Sept. 7, 2006). 
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Table 2: DVD Video Licensing Costs (1997–2004)  























1997 $489.97 $19.60 $17.15 $6.37 $43.12 
1998 $390.18 $15.61 $13.66 $5.07 $34.34 
1999 $270.00 $10.80 $9.45 $3.51 $23.76 
2000 $201.55 $8.06 $7.05 $2.62 $17.74 
2001 $165.00 $6.60 $5.78 $2.15 $14.52 
2002 $142.00 $5.68 $5.00* $1.85 $12.53 
2003 $123.00 $4.92 $5.00* $1.60 $11.52 
2004 $108.60 $4.34 $5.00* $1.41 $10.76 
 
These amounts may now be compared to the hypothetical royalties that 
a single pool would charge licensees. 
How much would a single pool need to charge to entice the highest-
paid outsider to join? First, one must determine which entity is the highest-
paid licensor. Thomson’s profits for each product sold appear in Table 2. It 
is possible that a member of the DVD3C or DVD6C pool earned more 
than Thomson for each product sold. It is difficult to know this, however, 
because the formulas that apportion royalties among the three members of 
the DVD3C pool and the six members of the DVD6C pool are 
confidential. 280  If the pools relied upon simple per-capita divisions, 
however, then Thomson always collected more than any member of the 3C 
or 6C pool for each net sale. If the formulas were more complex (which the 
business review letters indicate), then it is possible that one member of the 
3C group could have collected more than Thomson at any time.281 In the 
interest of keeping the final estimates conservative, however, one may select 
 
 280. See DVD3C Response Letter, supra note 244, at 6 (“The allocation of royalties 
among the Licensors is not a function of the number of patents contributed to the pool.”). 
 281. See id.  
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Thomson’s royalties as a measure of the highest amount any member would 
need to collect in a unified pool.282 
Now it is useful to consider what total rate a patent pool using the 
various royalty-division rules outlined in the prior discussion would need to 
charge to ensure that Thomson received at least the level of royalties that it 
was able to collect independently. First, we can consider a formula based 
upon the number of patents infringed by a product, defined earlier in 
Equation 2. As explained earlier in this Article, the per-patent-family rate 
charged by a pool is a more accurate indicator of the value each member 
brings to the table than a per-patent rate and is reflective of the formulas 
that pools use in practice. For that reason, this example considers a formula 
that apportions royalties based on the number of patent families 
contributed. Thomson, as reported in Table 1, would have ten patent 
families to contribute to the pool. Therefore, the per-patent-family rate 
charged by the pool can be calculated simply by dividing Thomson’s return 
(in Table 2) by ten. A flaw in this approach, of course, is the fact that patent 
composition may have changed during the period (1997–2004). As 
explained earlier, patents may have been added to or removed from pools. 
As a result, the calculation is Table 3 is approximate. 
  
 
 282. This assumption does not hold in all cases, as the 3C or 6C pools reach their 
royalty minima. However, the limitation of this assumption does not undermine the 
conclusion that pools consolidate at the highest royalty rate. 
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1997 $0.64 $28.03 $73.26 $6.37 $107.65 
1998 $0.51 $22.31 $58.31 $5.07 $85.68 
1999 $0.35 $15.44 $40.37 $3.51 $59.32 
2000 $0.26 $11.53 $30.13 $2.62 $44.28 
2001 $0.22 $9.46 $24.73 $2.15 $36.34 
2002 $0.19 $8.14 $21.28 $1.85 $31.27 
2003 $0.16 $7.04 $18.40 $1.60 $27.04 
2004 $0.14 $6.20 $16.22 $1.41 $23.83 
 
What would the unified pool need to charge if it relied upon a per-capita 
formula? Referring to Equation 1, the information in Table 1, and the 
assumption that Thomson is the highest-paid licensor, the amounts under 
this hypothetical can be calculated, as shown in Table 4. To clarify, the 
DVD3C column receives three-times Thomson’s rate, and the DVD6C 
pool receives six-times. Total licensing costs to a licensee appear in the 
right-most column. 
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COSTS (PER UNIT 
SOLD) 
(“RATEPC”) 
1997 $38.22 $19.11 $6.37 $63.70 
1998 $30.42 $15.21 $5.07 $50.70 
1999 $21.06 $10.53 $3.51 $35.10 
2000 $15.72 $7.86 $2.62 $26.20 
2001 $12.90 $6.45 $2.15 $21.50 
2002 $11.10 $5.55 $1.85 $18.50 
2003 $9.60 $4.80 $1.60 $16.00 
2004 $8.46 $4.23 $1.41 $14.10 
 
A comparison of the rates appears below: 












TO LICENSEES UNDER 
PRO-RATA 
ALLOCATION 
1997 $43.12 $63.70 $107.65 
1998 $34.34 $50.70 $85.68 
1999 $23.76 $35.10 $59.32 
2000 $17.74 $26.20 $44.28 
2001 $14.52 $21.50 $36.34 
2002 $12.53 $18.50 $31.27 
2003 $11.52 $16.00 $27.04 
2004 $10.76 $14.10 $23.83 
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The increase in licensing costs under a unified pool can be derived by 
subtracting RateActual in the first column from either RatePC or RatePP, 
depending on which royalty-division formula one wishes to consider in the 
hypothetical. The result is RatePremium, defined earlier in Equation 4. 
Turning to transaction costs, in 2017 Robert Merges and I gathered 
financial data from the largest patent pool administrators in the United 
States that can be directly applied to this estimate. Based on our findings, 
the average licensee incurs about $35,000 in costs per year dealing with a 
patent pool. 283  These amounts stem from administrative fees tied to 
reporting sales data, making royalty payments, and the like.284 (The patent 
pool eliminates negotiation and search costs.) This example assumes that 
licensees incur similar ongoing transaction costs when working with 
individual outsider licensors. Added to this, in the case of an individual 
outsider, is the initial cost of negotiating an agreement. A widely-cited 
estimate suggests the average cost of an average patent licensing would be 
about “$50,000 per licensee per patent.”285 The evidence revealed in this 
Article suggests the amount might be lower, however, as a pool effectively 
places a ceiling on the negotiations, which could simplify the process. An 
annual cost can be estimated by dividing this upfront negotiation cost over 
some period of time during which the patent has commercial value. If one 
assumes that period of time to be ten years, for instance, the average annual 
cost is $5,000. To keep the estimate conservative, however, we may assume 
a higher value of, say, $15,000. In summary, this example assumes that a 
licensee spends an average of $35,000 in transaction costs for each pool it 
licenses from and approximately $50,000 in transaction costs working with 
one outside licensor.286 
Applying these numbers to the DVD example, one may assume, 
conservatively, that each licensee incurred about $120,000 in annual 
administrative costs to work with two patent pools and one outsider (i.e., 
$35,000 in costs for one pool, plus $35,000 for a second pool, plus $35,000 
in administrative costs of dealing with the outsider, plus an initial cost of 
$15,000 in negotiation costs with the outsiders). Under a unified pool, the 
annual cost would drop to $35,000. Referring to Equation 4, the total 
 
 283. See Merges & Mattioli, supra note 15, at 322–23. 
 284. See id. 
 285. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 
1495, 1507 (2001) (“[A] reasonable estimate of the cost of negotiating a license might be 
$50,000 per licensee per patent.”). 
 286. It is important to emphasize that, industry-wide, patent pools profoundly reduce 
transaction costs by reducing the number of necessary transactions and negotiations. See 
Merges & Mattioli, supra note 15, at 320. 
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annual transaction costs saved (TCostsSaved) would be approximately 
$85,000.  
To compare the annual transaction costs conserved to the higher rate 
discussed earlier and defined in Equation 4, it is necessary to estimate the 
total annual costs that a licensee might incur under the higher rate. (Until 
now, this discussion has discussed the rate in terms of per-unit sales). One 
can develop a ballpark figure by multiplying the RatePremium number by 
the total number of units that a licensee might expect to sell each year. 
Publicly available sales data reported in Form 10-K filings and annual 
reports makes it possible to draw such an estimate for an average licensee. 
In the year 2001, for instance, Sony reported selling thirty-nine million 
DVD players. 287  In the interest of keeping the estimate conservative, 
however, one can consider far lower average sales numbers. Table 6, below, 
assumes an annual average sales figure of just one million units during the 
relevant years.  




















SALES OF 1M 
UNITS) 
1997 $20.48M $90,000 $20.58 $20.58M 
1998 $16.26M $90,000 $16.36 $16.36M 
1999 $11.24M $90,000 $11.34 $11.34M 
2000 $8.36M $90,000 $8.46 $8.46M 
2001 $6.88M $90,000 $6.98 $6.98M 
2002 $5.87M $90,000 $5.97 $5.97M 
2003 $4.38M $90,000 $4.48 $4.48M 
2004 $3.24M $90,000 $3.34 $3.34M 
 
 287. See SONY CORP., SONY CORPORATION ANNUAL REPORT 2001 at 39 (2001), 
www.sony-latin.com/corporate/SOLA/acerca/infocorporativa/pdf/info_financiera/
ar2001e.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5HF-2YV9]. 
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These calculations indicate that licensees should far prefer the current 
environment, in which they must license from two pools and one licensor, 
to the hypothetical setting where one pool has lured in all outsiders with 
higher royalties. This conclusion is directly at odds with warnings that some 
industry analysts gave at the time fragmentation in the DVD licensing 
landscape occurred.288 
In summary, the small outsider margin, multiplied across a pool in the 
manner pools commonly distribute royalties, leads to a significant price 
difference for licensees. If one assumes that a single pool would need to 
merely offer outsiders an amount equal to what they can collect outside of 
the pool and if one also assumes that such a pool would rely upon a 
commonly used basis for the division of royalties (as opposed to 
disproportionately compensating the outsider), the result could mean much 
higher rates than licensees currently pay. Outsiders may not be powerful, 
but multiplication is. 
C. THE VIRTUES OF IMPERFECT COOPERATION 
The foregoing suggests a provocative idea with implications that reach 
beyond patent markets: partial cooperation may, in some settings, be 
preferable to complete cooperation. In the context of patent pools, this 
condition is met when the marginal premium charged by an outsider 
multiplied according to the royalty-sharing rules in a pool (to lure in the 
outsider) exceeds the transaction costs that licensees would save by dealing 
with a single licensor. The case of DVD patent licensing appears to meet 
these conditions. This does not reflect the power of outsiders but rather that 
of modest arithmetic: multiplied across a pool according to the most 
commonly used royalty-division formulas, the small outsider margin can 
yield a significant total price increase. 
It would be a mistake to conclude that robust patent pools that contain 
many essential patents are not extremely helpful. To the contrary, as 
discussed earlier, Robert Merges and I have estimated that the average 
transaction cost savings of a modern patent pool is on the order of $400 to 
$600 million.289 The foregoing discussion presumes a partially integrated 
pool taking steps to draw in a reluctant outsider. The takeaway is that the 
benefits pools offer are not lost or even undermined simply because an 
outside licensor also exists. Assuming no independent competitive concerns 
 
 288. See Sony, Philips Break Ranks, Prepare DVD Licensing Fees, OPTICAL 
MEMORY NEWS, Aug. 13, 1996 (“The price of digital videodisk (DVD) technology may 
balloon if other patent holders follow the lead of Sony Electronics and Philips Electronics 
NV and set licensing fees for their DVD patents, warn industry analysts.”). 
 289. See Merges & Mattioli, supra note 15, at 322. 
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exist, regulators should assume that the patents that are within pools belong 
there, and the patents held by outsiders are not a cause for concern. By 
setting a baseline for outside negotiations, pools prevent these outsiders 
from upsetting the careful balance the pools set for their members and 
licensees. The fact that some patent holders prefer not to join a central pool 
is not necessarily a bad thing—not for licensees, not for other patent 
holders, and not for the pool. Antitrust regulators concerned by recent 
scholarship on patent pool outsiders should consider this in their evaluation 
of patent pools. 
Scholars in other areas of law and policy might take something away 
from this too. Contrary to conventional wisdom, there may exist in any 
given market for complementary rights an optimal level of diffusion of 
ownership. Jonathan Barnett has explored this concept at a high theoretical 
level in a compelling and thought-provoking 2009 article.290 Somewhere 
between the ideal of a grand coalition and the proverbial anticommons, 
there may exist middle positions where partial coalitions work alongside 
outsiders, subtly influencing one another in ways that are helpful or even 
optimal for all involved. These settings may superficially look messy and 
plagued by disagreements. As this study has shown, however, looks can be 
deceiving. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has examined a question fundamental to law and policy: 
how do individuals who decline to join cooperative groups affect the good 
those groups can do? In the context of patents, this is a deeply important 
question because it challenges the belief that regulators have shaped their 
policies around—i.e., that patent holders can privately remedy the high 
transaction costs that pervade technology licensing. 
Antitrust regulators have long assumed that outsider patent holders that 
decline to join pools do not disrupt the benefits that patent pools offer. 
Against this backdrop, a rising chorus of critics has theorized compellingly 
that outsiders are more harmful than regulators assume. By demanding 
royalty rates that far exceed those requested by the pool, these theorists 
argue, outsiders quietly undermine the transaction cost savings the pool 
delivers to licensees. As the theorists see it, outsiders work both sides of the 
deal, demanding high royalties from licensees while at the same time 
pressuring pools for a healthier cut of the profits. This theory suggests that 
 
 290. See generally Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation Markets 
Select Innovation Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 387–91, 432–37 (2009).  
MATTIOLI_FINALFORMAT_06-24-18 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2018 6:22 PM 
 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:233  294
the mere presence of an outsider of multiple pools should cast doubt on the 
efficiencies and benefits that a pool under examination can offer. 
By applying an ethnographic approach, this Article has revealed an 
intimate and surprising look at the reality of this situation. The most 
important finding is that outsiders are not as powerful as the theorists have 
guessed. This is because the royalty rate charged by a patent pool is a 
powerful signal to those outside of the pool (including courts) of the 
reasonable value of all patents concerned. 
Meanwhile, it seems that licensees are willing to resist and defy outside 
licensors that ask for rates far out of step with a prominent pool. As research 
subjects explained, some licensors work independently because they are 
highly motivated to “get their money fast.” 291  These licensors are 
understandably eager to avoid the delays and costs of pursuing a patent 
infringement suit against a licensee. Moreover, suing for infringement in 
this context can be risky: as the Lucent episode shows, an aggressive outsider 
strategy can backfire, leading to validity challenges and counterclaims for 
infringement. As one subject explained, being an outsider can also lead to 
negative press that a company might prefer to avoid.292 Added to this is the 
relative difficulty of obtaining an injunction, even when infringement is 
found. The general view shared by subjects is that courts will tend to look 
to a patent pool for a ballpark sense of the value of the patents infringed. It 
is no wonder that the licensing rates charged by outsiders in the DVD and 
MPEG-2 episodes were roughly in line with those of the pools they 
operated alongside. 
The impetus to keep royalties reigned-in is even stronger for outside 
patent holders who are also licensees of a pool. As the DVD study shows, 
Thomson (a manufacturer) was highly successful in conducting outside 
licenses overall, but it lowered its asking price when making deals with 
patent holders whose patents it wished to license. A patent pool that 
includes a grant-back clause for licensees would make this a contractual 
obligation. 
Finally, an outside licensor who, despite these many countervailing 
forces, succeeds in getting licensees to agree to pay a high rate still must 
contend with underreporting of sales. As research subjects explained, 
underreporting is common (it is costly to monitor and detect), and it tends 
to nudge payments from licensees to outsiders to be in line with pool rates. 
The examination of royalty rates and prices in Part III brings these 
findings into stark relief. The data analyzed support the qualitative insights 
 
 291. Telephone Interview with Subject #8 (July 15, 2017). 
 292. Id. 
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shared by research subjects: the per-patent-family rates charged by two 
pools and one independent licensor were all within a similar range. 
Moreover, to bring all patent holders in, a single pool may have had to raise 
its royalty rates in a manner that would have resulted in an overall price 
increase for licensees. This is not because the outsider advantage is large, 
but rather, because of how pools divide royalties: the small margin needed 
to draw in an outsider, multiplied across a pool in the manner pools usually 
distribute royalties, leads to a significant difference in price. The existing 
licensing landscape, imperfect as it might seem, may be more desirable than 
more aesthetically pleasing alternatives. 
Putting this all together, cooperation among patent holders is not an 
all-or-nothing game. Contrary to theory, outsiders and secondary pools do 
not appear to undermine the benefits that patent pools offer. This is because 
patent pools have a quiet but powerful influence on negotiations that take 
place “poolside,” so to speak. This is why the gentle fragmentation among 
licensors that pervades technology licensing is mostly harmless, probably 
inevitable, and sometimes actually preferable to the alternative. Antitrust 
regulators who must evaluate patent pools should find this knowledge 
helpful. This finding can also be helpful to scholars concerned by outsider 
problems in many other areas of law and policy. An ethnographic approach 
like the one followed here can reveal aspects of an outsider situation that 
theory alone does not capture. Sometimes, the collective will of a group 
overpowers individual self-interest; sometimes, an outsider is also a good 
neighbor; sometimes, a little cooperation is not only better than none, but 
also better than more. 
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